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I. INTRODUCTION
Religion enjoys a special status under the laws of the United States
of America.1 Scholars debate the justification for religion’s special sta-
tus, contending it is due to the circumstances of history; the contrast
between rationality and supra-rationality; the inherent value of relig-
ion in promoting a peaceful society; or merely the fact the First
Amendment decrees it so.2 A particularly convincing explanation for
1. See Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 303 (2001).
2. Id. at 323; see also id. at 351 (“It does not matter whether a practice is called a
religion or a philosophy, or whether it is perceived to be rational or irrational. If the
practice serves the functions religion serves (helping to balance power, speaking for
the marginalized, articulating non-market values, and supporting personal spirituality
and dignity), then the practice should be entitled to free exercise exemptions and be
subject to Establishment Clause limits.”).
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the special status of religion under the law is based on the functions of
religion in society: balancing power, advancing minority rights, pro-
moting “non-market driven values,” and serving as a source of
identity.3
Whatever the justification for the status of religion may be, it is un-
deniable that religion enjoys special legal treatment today in the form
of federal and state tax exemption, the “ministerial exception” to em-
ployment discrimination laws, and a court’s limited ability to act in
matters concerning religious doctrine.4 The special status of religion
complicates otherwise routine matters dealt with by courts, particu-
larly when both parties to a suit are religious factions and the dispute
is rooted in religious doctrine.5
One area of litigation where such complications are apparent is in
the realm of hierarchical religious real property disputes.6 An action
to quiet title, typically a straight-forward claim for a court to handle,
becomes increasingly complex as the church divides into an unincor-
porated religious association and a non-profit corporation.7 Each side
to the dispute then claims to represent the “true” association and, or
non-profit corporation quickly multiplying the number of potential
entities involved.8 The religious nature of these entities impedes a
court’s ability to identify the “true” entities because of First Amend-
ment complications.9
Since the Supreme Court allowed states the option of using the neu-
tral-principles-of-law method to resolve church property disputes,
commentators have bemoaned this method as unpredictable and un-
balanced.10 Numerous solutions have been proposed to alleviate the
perceived inequities that result from the application of the neutral-
3. See id. at 332 (“Religious liberty may be necessary in order to enable religion
and religious institutions to serve important independent societal functions. I can
identify at least four related functions that religion serves: (1) religion helps balance
power and limit the power of both the government and organized faith; (2) religion
sometimes enables disempowered groups to organize and increase their power; (3)
religion produces values that are neither market-driven nor controlled by the govern-
ment; and (4) religion provides a source of spirituality and personal identity that en-
ables individuals to live with purpose and dignity.”).
4. See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Losing Our Religion: Reevaluating the Section
501(c)(3) Exemption of Religious Organizations That Discriminate, 17 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 715, 715–18 (2009); see also Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?
Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273,
287 (2008).
5. See infra Part II.C.3.i.
6. See infra Part II.C.3.i.
7. See infra Part II.C.3.i.
8. See infra Part II.C.3.i.
9. See infra Part II.C.3.i.
10. See Ashley Alderman, Where’s the Wall?: Church Property Disputes Within the
Civil Courts and the Need for Consistent Application of the Law, 39 GA. L. REV. 1027,
1052 (2005) (citing Nathan Clay Belzer, Deference in the Judicial Resolution of In-
trachurch Disputes: The Lesser of Two Constitutional Evils, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
109, 130 (1998)); see also Christopher W. Wynne, WWJD: A True Neutral Principles
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principles-of-law method to hierarchical religious property disputes.11
These solutions involve passing federal statutes and placing greater
emphasis on church constitutions.12 Other scholars think the neutral-
principles-of-law method lacks true neutrality because of its consider-
ation of the constitutions of national denominations, which are relig-
ious content.13 These scholars maintain that true neutrality requires a
court not to consider the constitutions of national religious denomina-
tions at all.14
However, a strict neutral-principles-of-law approach of analyzing
the facts through only a secular lens essentially ignores the ecclesiasti-
cal character of religious property disputes altogether. While this op-
tion initially appeals to constitutional sensibilities, can a court that is
unable to look to the true cause of a dispute resolve it with an accept-
able level of justice?
This Comment proposes adding contractual stipulations that result
from the surgical arbitration of two questions to the neutral-princi-
ples-of-law method analysis. Outsourcing the question: “Did the na-
tional denomination substantially and unforeseeably change its
doctrine?” to arbitration, allows the underlying cause of the hierarchi-
cal religious property dispute to be weighed by a court without com-
promising that court’s religious neutrality. This Comment will explore
this issue primarily in the context of the Presbyterian Church’s
(U.S.A.) (“PC(USA)”) affiliation with local churches in Texas that re-
cently attempted to disassociate from the national denomination.15
The first Section of this Comment will briefly examine the historical
context surrounding the founding of the Nation and of the Presbyte-
rian Church. The second Section will examine the development of the
law regarding hierarchical church property disputes. Finally, the third
Section will examine proposed alternatives to the current method of
adjudicating hierarchical church property disputes and conclude by
advancing the surgical arbitration proposal.
Approach? Arkansas Courts Should Take Another Look, 65 ARK. L. REV. 481, 505
(2012).
11. See Part III infra.
12. See Part III infra.
13. Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Relig-
ious Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 547–50 (1990).
14. Id.
15. The taxonomy of Presbyterian Church can be somewhat confusing. “PCUSA”
refers to the denomination from 1788–1958, while “PC(USA)” refers to the current
incarnation of the denomination from 1983 to the present. In the intervening gap the
denomination existed as the “UPCUSA.” See JAMES H. SMYLIE, A BRIEF HISTORY
OF THE PRESBYTERIANS 2 (Geneva Press ed. 1996).
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A. The Old World mixture of church and state was
a witch’s brew of turmoil.
Look to Western history and one will see a line of church schisms,
one begetting the next, followed by a trail of warfare, inquisition, and
intolerance.16 The desire to escape this ecclesiastically motivated car-
nage was one impetus that induced British citizens to leave the British
Isles for the Thirteen Colonies between the 16th and 18th centuries.17
England’s disassociation from the Roman Catholic Church opened
the proverbial gate to centuries of religious and political strife in the
British Isles and colonial territories.18 The fluctuation of monarchs
professing opposing religious views mixed with the entanglement of
church and state rapidly boiled a bloody cauldron of civil discord.19
The persecution of supposed heretics or traitors involved the cruel ex-
ecutions of thousands.20 The resulting backlash wrought havoc in the
British Isles with a series of wars responsible for tens of thousands of
casualties and culminated with the end of the absolute monarchy in
England.21
16. See generally John E. Drabble, Mary’s Protestant Martyrs and Elizabeth’s
Catholic Traitors in the Age of Catholic Emancipation, 51 CHURCH HIST. NO. 2 (1982),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3165834; see also Alice Hunt, The Monarchical Republic of
Mary I, 52 HIST. J. NO. 3, 557 (2009); see also L. M. Hill, The Marian “Experience of
Defeat”: The Case of Sir John Bourne, 25 SIXTEENTH CENTURY J. 3, 531–49 (1994),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2542632; see also Sarah Waureghen, Covenanter Propa-
ganda and Conceptualizations of the Public during the Bishops Wars, 1638–1640, 52
HIST. J. 1, 63–86, 65 (2009).
17. See David W. Noble, HISTORIANS AGAINST HISTORY: THE FRONTIER THESIS
AND THE NATIONAL COVENANT IN AMERICAN HISTORICAL WRITING SINCE 1830 5
(U. Minn. Press 1967), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttt28q.
18. See generally John E. Drabble, Mary’s Protestant Martyrs and Elizabeth’s
Catholic Traitors in the Age of Catholic Emancipation, 51 AM. SOC’Y CHURCH HIST. 2
(1982), http://www.jstor.org/stable/3165834; see generally Alice Hunt, The Monarchi-
cal Republic of Mary I, 52 HIST. J. 3 (2009), http://www.jstor.org/stable/40264190.
19. See generally supra note 18.
20. See generally 9 JOHN FOXE, THE ACTS AND MONUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH (Ex-classics Project 2009) (1563), http://www.exclassics.com/foxe/foxe9pdf
.pdf; see generally 10 JOHN FOXE, THE ACTS AND MONUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH (Ex-classics Project 2009) (1563), http://www.exclassics.com/foxe/fox10pdf
.pdf; see generally 11 JOHN FOXE, THE ACTS AND MONUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH (Ex-classics Project 2009) (1563), http://www.exclassics.com/foxe/fox11pdf
.pdf; see generally 12 JOHN FOXE, THE ACTS AND MONUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH (Ex-classics Project 2010) (1563), http://www.exclassics.com/foxe/fox12pdf
.pdf; see generally 13 JOHN FOXE, THE ACTS AND MONUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH (Ex-classics Project 2010) (1563), http://www.exclassics.com/foxe/fox13pdf
.pdf (illustrating that immolation, drawing and quartering, murder, and torture of re-
ligious or political opponents was common in this time period).
21. See ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1689, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
17th_century/england.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2015); see generally Charles Carlton,
Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars 1638-1651, 24 SIXTEENTH
CENTURY J. 3, 740 (1994).
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B. Origins and Beliefs of the Presbyterian Church
The Presbyterian Church initially emerged as the Church of Scot-
land in 1560.22 It differed structurally from other Reformed Protestant
movements with respect to its hierarchical structure of bodies, which
were listed in descending order: the General Assembly, the Synod, the
Presbytery, and the Session.23 The exact specifications of who consti-
tutes each body, and each body’s exact powers, are somewhat com-
plex.24 Basically, the Presbyterian Church generally uses a
representative system to vote in equal ratios of clergy and laity to
serve as commissioners in the higher bodies of the denomination.25
This system reflects the Presbyterian Church’s early values of parity
between the clergy and laity, as well as its historical commitment to
representative government stretching back to the English Civil
Wars.26 A presbytery has two important powers particularly relevant
to church property disputes: the power to create and dissolve
churches, as well as the power to ordain candidates for ministry.27 Ti-
tle to local church property is usually held at the Session level by a
non-profit corporation as trustee for the use and benefit of the local
church.28
The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America
(“PCUSA”) traces its history back to the Synod of Philadelphia that
was founded in 1716.29 In the wilderness of the frontier, charismatic
revivals caused early theological tensions within the church that would
recur with westward expansion.30  Although King George III and his
22. See OFF. OF THE GEN. ASSEMBLY, PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A) PART I: BOOK OF CONFES-
SIONS 10 (2014), http://www.pcusa.org/site_media/media/uploads/oga/pdf/boc2014.pdf
[hereinafter BOOK OF CONFESSIONS].
23. See id.; see also SMYLIE, supra note 15, at 23–38.
24. All of a local church’s clergy and elders (laity elected by congregation) consti-
tute the Session. OFF. OF THE GEN. ASSEMBLY, PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.),
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE (U.S.A) PART II: BOOK
OF ORDER 2015–2017 48 (2015), http://store.pcusa.org/OGA15010 [hereinafter BOOK
OF ORDER]. All of the Sessions within a geographic district belong to a Presbytery.
All clergy in that district and an equal number of elders sit on that council. Id. at 50; A
Synod is a group of Presbyteries within a region. Each Presbytery elects one cleric and
one elder to serve as commissioners in the Synod. Id. at 54. The General Assembly
includes all Presbyteries within the nation. The number of commissioners (again an
equal ratio of clergy and elders) a Presbytery may send to the General Assembly is
dependent on the size of the Presbytery. Id. at 57.
25. See generally BOOK OF ORDER, supra note 24.
26. See BOOK OF CONFESSIONS, supra note 22, at 120, 146.
27. BOOK OF ORDER, supra note 24, at 52, 36.
28. Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 1995
BYU L. REV. 439, 441–42 (1995) (“ . . . 87% [of national religious organizations] use
the religious not-for-profit corporation form . . .”); see also BOOK OF ORDER, supra
note 24, at 61.
29. It is helpful to note that the Synod of New York and Philadelphia did not
maintain any ties to the Church of Scotland. SMYLIE, supra note 15, at 43.
30. See id. at 48–49, 69–73.
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underlings characterized the American Revolution as a “Presbyterian
rebellion,” not all Presbyterians were united behind the rebellion
against the Crown.31 After the Colonies achieved independence, the
Synod of New York and Philadelphia promoted itself to the General
Assembly of the PCUSA.32
PCUSA’s history is filled with divisions and reconciliations. While
some disputes were mostly religious in nature,33 the fault lines of the
majority of disputes formed along civil rights issues. PCUSA has gen-
erally been ahead of the curve on civil rights issues.34 PCUSA de-
nounced slavery very early in the nation’s history.35 Some members of
the PCUSA tried to defend the sovereignty of Cherokee territory im-
mediately preceding governmental action that later resulted in the
Trail of Tears.36 PCUSA opposed segregation before the status quo
was ready.37 PCUSA was not as early a proponent of women’s rights
as their Congregationalist cousins, but PCUSA did not lag far be-
hind.38 As of 2013, around half of the leadership of PC(USA)39 is
31. Richard Gardiner, The Presbyterian Rebellion?, J. AM. REVOLUTION (Sept. 5,
2013), http://allthingsliberty.com/2013/09/presbyterian-rebellion/.
32. SMYLIE, supra note 15, at 62.
33. See John Fea, In Search of Unity: Presbyterians in the Wake of the First Great
Awakening, 86 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. 2, 53 (2008), http://www.jstor.org/stable/
23338196.
34. See infra notes 25–30.
35. PCUSA called for the abolition of slavery in 1787. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN
THE U.S.A, RECORDS OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES 539
(Presbyterian Board of Publication And Sabbath-School Work, 1904) (“The Creator
of the world having made of one flesh all the children of men, it becomes them as
members of the same family, to consult and promote each other’s happiness. It is
more especially the duty of those who maintain the rights of humanity, and who ac-
knowledge and teach the obligations of Christianity, to use such means as are in their
power to extend the blessings of equal freedom to every part of the human race. From
a full conviction of these truths, and sensible that the rights of human nature are too
well understood to admit of debate, Overtured, that the Synod of New York and
Philadelphia recommend, in the warmest terms, to every member of their body, and
to all the churches and families under their care, to do every thing in their power
consistent with the rights of civil society, to promote the abolition of slavery, and the
instruction of negroes, whether bond or free.”).
36. Chief among them was US Attorney General William Wirt who argued before
the Supreme Court “The Cherokees are a state. They have been uniformly treated as
a state since the settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by
the United States recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of
peace and war; of being responsible in their political, character for any violation of
their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United
States by any individual of their community.” Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1,
14 (1831); see generally Joseph C. Robert, William Wirt, Virginian, 80 VA. MAG. HIST.
AND BIOGRAPHY 4, 387–41 (1972), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4247747.
37. See generally Presbyterians and the Civil Rights Movement, PRESBYTERIAN
HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.history.pcusa.org/history-online/exhibits/commission-religion
-and-race-page-1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
38. See generally R. Douglas Brackenridge & Lois A. Boyd, United Presbyterian
Policy on Women and the Church—an Historical Overview, 59 J. OF PRESBYTERIAN
HIST. 3, 383, 385–86 (1981), http://www.jstor.org/stable/23328186.
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made up of women.40 PC(USA) is also pro-choice regarding legal con-
straints on abortion.41 One of the most significant issues contributing
to the current exodus of local churches from PC(USA) is its accept-
ance of same-sex marriage and ordination of non-celibate homosexual
ministers.42
These progressive positions caused PCUSA—and PC(USA)—to
suffer numerous divisions throughout its history. The nation’s issues
leading up to the Civil War fractured PCUSA four ways.43 These
wounds would not be healed until 1983, and even then not entirely,
because of compounding complications from PC(USA)’s other pro-
gressive stances.44 What healing did occur, however, is now being un-
done by the current exodus.45 Historical context is crucial to achieving
a full understanding of the disputes giving rise to the current hierar-
chical church property litigation occurring in Texas.
II. BACKGROUND
This Section will survey the relevant laws regarding hierarchical
church property disputes. The first Subsection will examine the origins
of the First Amendment. The second Subsection will discuss the
evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the topic of hierarchical
church property disputes. The third Subsection will address Texas law
regarding the adjudication of hierarchical church property disputes.
A. The Founders Motivation for Drafting the First Amendment
On June 8, 1789, House Representative, James Madison, first pro-
posed amending the Constitution.46 As the House of Representatives
debated the exact wording of its draft of the religion clauses, many of
the viewpoints of the founders manifested in the legislative history.47
39. Again, “PC(USA)” refers to the organization from 1983–present, while
“PCUSA” refers to the organization from 1788–1958. See supra note 15.
40. RESEARCH SERVICES, PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), COMPARATIVE STA-
TISTICS 2013 25 (2014), http://www.pcusa.org/site_media/media/uploads/research/pdfs/
table_13-14_comparative_statistics_2013.pdf.
41. Report of the Special Committee On Problem Pregnancies And Abortion, OFF.
GEN. ASSEMBLY PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH 11 (1992), http://www.pcusa.org/site_media/
media/uploads/oga/pdf/problem-pregnancies.pdf (“We do not wish to see laws en-
acted that would attach criminal penalties to those who seek abortions or to appropri-
ately qualified and licensed persons who perform abortions in medically approved
facilities.”).
42. See generally Leslie Scanlon, Who’s Joining the Exodus? Departure of
PC(USA) Congregations to Other Denominations Accelerates, PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH (USA) (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.pcusa.org/news/2013/9/20/whos-joining-
exodus/.
43. SMILEY, supra note 15, at 87–93.
44. See id. at 141.
45. See generally Scanlon, supra note 42.
46. Anita Y. Woudenberg, Propagating A Lemon: How the Supreme Court Estab-
lishes Religion in the Name of Neutrality, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 307, 310 (2009).
47. Id. at 312.
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Madison’s primary intent was to ensure that the amendment prohib-
ited the establishment of an official national religion.48 Others feared
the proposed language could be misinterpreted to eliminate all relig-
ion.49 The Senate’s debate was primarily concerned with preventing
federal law from advancing one religious denomination above
another.50
Essentially, the Founders did not want to duplicate the historical
experience in England, where some religious groups exercised
superior rights due to the laws of the land preferring one group over
another.51 The Founders also wanted to ensure that no religious de-
nomination was granted privileges others lacked.52 The law has never
enshrined any of the hierarchical churches as an official national de-
nomination. The operation of the Watson hierarchical deference re-
gime, however, could be seen on some level as granting the clergy of a
hierarchical denomination a superior right in church property disputes
relative to their counterparts in non-hierarchical churches.53
B. United States Supreme Court Church Property Jurisprudence
Over the course of American history, the main methods of resolving
church property disputes can be placed into three general categories:
the departure-from-doctrine rule, the Watson hierarchical deference
rule, and the neutral-principles-of-law method. The following Subsec-
tions examine the means of operation and judicial history of each of
these methodologies.
1. Departure-from-Doctrine Rule
English law resolved church property disputes by first investigating
the religious beliefs on both sides of a split and then awarding the
property to the side whose beliefs most conformed to the official doc-
trine of the church.54 In contrast, the United States Constitution for-
bids the government from interfering with matters of religious
establishment; therefore, the courts needed to create a new rule to
deal with church property disputes.55 The Watson Court stated:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious be-
lief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious
48. Id. at 312 & n.29.
49. Id. at 312.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 313.
52. Id. at 314–15.
53. See Michael William Galligan, Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 2007, 2020 (1983) (“. . . [the deference approach] violates the estab-
lishment clause for two reasons. First, it has the unintended consequence of causing
courts to make doctrinal decisions. Second, the deference rule treats organizations
differently on the basis of their religious orientation.”).
54. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1872).
55. Id. at 728.
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doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property,
and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The
law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma,
the establishment of no sect.56
In Presbyterian Church of the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, the Supreme Court expressly
held that the departure-from-doctrine rule was unconstitutional.57
2. Watson Hierarchical Deference Rule
Watson v. Jones created the Watson hierarchical deference rule that
would be the law of the land from 1871 to 1979.58 Watson involved
the threshold question of whether or not a church was hierarchical or
congregational.59 A hierarchical church uses a large system of con-
nected churches that are subordinate to a larger governing entity.60
There are also intermediate hierarchical churches such as the Presby-
terian and Methodist churches.61 A congregational church may still
loosely align with other churches, but it is essentially a single sover-
eign church, like Baptist, Church of Christ, or independent-charis-
matic churches.62 If a church was determined to be a hierarchical
church, then courts deferred to an appropriate ecclesiastical tribunal
to decide the matter.63
3. Neutral-Principles-of-Law Method
In Blue Hull, Justice Harlan first hinted at the neutral principle of
law method’s application to hierarchical church property disputes.64 In
1979, the Supreme Court held in Jones v. Wolf that each state had a
variety of methods available to it in dealing with hierarchical church
property disputes.65 Specifically, states were free to choose to con-
tinue using the Watson hierarchical deference rule, to use the neutral-
56. Id.
57. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969).
58. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 728–30.
59. Id. at 726–27.
60. Id.; The Roman Catholic Church is the quintessential example of a hierarchi-
cal church. Jeffrey B. Hassler, A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for Legal
Resolution of Church Property Disputes in a Time of Escalating Intradenominational
Strife, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 399, 405–06 (2008).
61. Watson, 80 U.S. at 728–30.
62. Id.
63. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 732–33.
64. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 452 (1969) (Harlan J., concurring) (“[T]he church should not be
permitted to keep the property simply because church authorities have determined
that the doctrinal innovation is justified by the faith’s basic principles.”).
65. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).
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principals-of-law method to determine secular issues, or to pass stat-
utes to deal with such issues.66
The Court expressly held that the ownership of disputed property
could be determined by applying the neutral-principals-of-law method
and considering evidence such as deeds to the property, the local
church charter, the bylaws of the entity holding the deed to the prop-
erty, and relevant provisions in the national denomination’s constitu-
tion.67 In fact, a state is free to use any method of law that “does not
impair free-exercise rights or entangle the civil courts in matters of
religious controversy.”68
C. Texas Law Relevant to Hierarchical Church Property Disputes
The following Subsections will cover relevant Texas law applicable
to hierarchical church property disputes. The first Subsection will ad-
dress trust law. The second Subsection will discuss Texas laws gov-
erning non-profit corporations. The third Subsection will examine the
coevolution of Texas jurisprudence in the light of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence and historical context.
1. Trusts and Hierarchical Church Property Disputes
Most church property is held by a non-profit corporation in charita-
ble trust for the benefit of its local congregation.69 A great deal of the
legal and academic controversy regarding the application of the neu-
tral-principles-of-law method to hierarchical church property disputes
revolves around issues of trust law.70 In addition, the surgical arbitra-
tion proposal advanced in this Comment is also partially based on
principles of trust law. Given how important trust law is to the follow-
ing discussion, it is beneficial to review trust concepts as elucidated by
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.
A trust is a legal relationship between parties with regard to prop-
erty.71 The creator of the trust is referred to as the settlor.72  The trust
property is the property involved in the trust.73 The trustee typically
holds legal title to the property, though sometimes he or she may hold
equitable title as well.74 The trustee holds title for the benefit of the
“beneficiary,” who holds equitable title to the trust property.75
66. Id. at 609.
67. Id. at 602–03.
68. Id. at 607–08.
69. See Gerstenblith, supra note 28, at 441–44.
70. See generally infra Part III.B–C; see also infra notes 191–94; see also infra note
205.
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
72. Id. § 3.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 2 cmt. d.
75. Id.; id. § 3.
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A trust may be characterized as private or charitable based on the
nature of a trust’s objective.76 A charitable trust must be created with
the objective of furthering the public good, without serving any pri-
vate trust interests.77 Several classes of objectives have long been held
to be charitable, including the advancement of religion—the class
most relevant to this Comment’s topic.78 The rules regarding charita-
ble trusts differ from private trusts in several aspects, e.g., charitable
trusts can be created even if lacking definite beneficiaries and may
extend beyond the duration normally allowed by the rule against per-
petuities because the property is said to “vest in charity.”79
To create a trust, the settlor must properly manifest the intent to do
so, e.g., a trust involving interests in real property must be in writing
and signed by the settlor as required by the statute of frauds.80 Ac-
cording to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, so long as the terms of
the trust contain no provision to the contrary, a settlor who fails to
expressly specify that a trust is revocable or amendable is presumed to
have no power to revoke or amend the trust if the settlor has retained
no interest in the trust property.81 However, if the settlor has retained
an interest in the trust property, he or she is presumed to have the
power to revoke or amend the trust.82 Texas trust law provides for the
opposite—a trust is presumed revocable unless its language makes it
expressly irrevocable.83 The fact that the American Legal Institute
states that trusts are irrevocable by default in all three editions of the
Restatement of Trust law demonstrate the jurisdictional ubiquity of
this rule. Perhaps this idiosyncrasy of Texas trust law is responsible for
the degree of contention regarding trusts in Texas hierarchical church
property litigation.84
A trustee typically has the power to revoke or amend a trust so long
as doing so remains within the bounds of the trustee’s fiduciary duty
to the beneficiary and the terms of the trust do not specify other-
wise.85 In general, a beneficiary does not have the power to revoke or
amend a trust unless given that power by the trust terms;86 however, if
all beneficiaries unanimously agree to a revocation or amendment to
76. Id. § 27.
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003).
78. Id. § 28(c).
79. Id. § 28 cmt. c–d.
80. Id. § 13 cmt. a; id. § 22.
81. Id. § 63 cmt. c.
82. Id.
83. “A settlor may revoke the trust unless it is irrevocable by the express terms of
the instrument creating it or of an instrument modifying it.” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 112.051(a) (West 2015).
84. “The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and to the extent that by the
terms of the trust he reserved such a power.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 330(1) (1959); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 330(1) (1935).
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64 cmt. b.
86. See id. at § 64.
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the trust, that alteration can be effected (except in certain
situations).87
If a circumstance unforeseen by the settlor when creating the trust
terms arises, the equitable-deviation doctrine allows the court to mod-
ify, or direct the trustee to modify, the terms of the trust to better
comply with the intent of the settlor in creating the trust.88 The equita-
ble-deviation doctrine is the mechanism to be utilized by the surgical
arbitration proposal to empower the court to modify the terms of any
existing trust.
2. Texas Non-profit Corporation Law
Many national denominations require that their local churches form
non-profit entities for the purpose of handling the civil affairs of the
local church.89 These non-profit corporations typically hold title to the
church in a charitable trust, as trustees for the benefit of the local
church.90 Depending on the wording of the terms of the trust, there
may exist some room for argument as to whether the beneficiary is the
local church, the national denomination, or both.
A local church’s non-profit corporation likely has references to the
national denomination in its certificate of formation and bylaws.
When a certificate of formation is inconsistent with the bylaws the
certificate of formation controls.91 A disassociating local church with
references to the national denomination in its certificate of formation
would first need to amend its certificate of formation to excise such
references. Amending the certificate of formation can be accom-
plished in a variety of manners, depending on the organization of the
non-profit corporation.92 After amending the certificate of formation,
the corporation can then amend its bylaws by following its own rules
for doing so. The board of directors can amend the bylaws themselves,
so long as the certificate of formation does not reserve that power to
its members, the management of the corporation is not vested in the
members, or unless the members have expressly forbidden the board
of directors to amend the bylaws in question.93
The next issue a disassociating board might face is that the national
denomination may try to replace the board. Under Texas law, if the
articles of formation or bylaws of a non-profit corporation provide for
a method of removing a director, then that method must be fol-
lowed.94 Any vacancies on a board will be filled by a majority vote of
87. Id. § 65 cmt. b.
88. Id. § 66 cmt. a.
89. BOOK OF ORDER, supra note 24, at 61.
90. See generally supra note 28.
91. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.103 (West Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.
of 84th Leg. 2006).
92. See §§ 22.105–.107 (Westlaw); see also § 3.063 (Westlaw).
93. § 22.102. (Westlaw).
94. § 22.211 (Westlaw).
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the remaining directors.95 So long as the certificate of formation and
bylaws do not allow the national denomination a means of removing
the directors, the sitting directors should be able to retain their places
on the board despite allegations to the contrary.
Depending on the structure and the disposition of the corporation’s
members or board of directors towards disassociation, it is likely a
local church with a majority in favor of disassociating from the na-
tional denomination will be able to legally manipulate the factors
evaluated under the neutral-principles-of-law method.
3. Texas Hierarchical Church Property Dispute Jurisprudence
Texas’s treatment of church property disputes has evolved parallel
to Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Texas cases discussed below ex-
amine how Texas law was applied in the past, and how it has changed
in more recent times.
a. Brown v. Clark and the Paradoxical Foundation of Both the
Identification Method and Neutral-Principles-of-Law Method for
Resolving Hierarchical Church Property Disputes
Brown v. Clark is one of the earliest Texas Supreme Court church
property dispute cases.96 It was decided in 1909, only thirty-eight years
into the 108-year reign of the Watson hierarchical deference rule.97 It
is the case cited to for the creation of the “identification method” that
would be employed by Texas courts for 104 years.98 Somewhat
counter-intuitively, it is also the case cited to by the Texas Supreme
Court in 2013 to show that Texas courts have always utilized the neu-
tral-principles-of-law method in hierarchical church property
disputes.99
Though the court only addresses one issue, 100 several factors influ-
enced the underlying dispute in the original split between PCUSA and
Cumberland Presbyterian Church (“CPC”). At the turn of the 19th
century, the Presbytery of Cumberland was located on the frontier.101
Charismatic revivals had a tendency to sweep through these rural ar-
95. § 22.212 (Westlaw).
96. See generally Brown v. Clark, 116 S.W. 360 (Tex. 1909).
97. See id.
98. Presbytery of the Covenant v. First Presbyterian Church of Paris, Inc., 552
S.W.2d 865, 871 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1977, no writ); see also Schismatic &
Purported Casa Linda Presbyterian Church in Am. v. Grace Union Presbytery, Inc.,
710 S.W.2d 700, 705–06 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see generally
Brown, 116 S.W. 360.
99. Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594, 605 (Tex. 2013); Episcopal
Diocese of Fort Worth v. Episcopal Church, 422 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2012).
100. See Brown, 116 S.W. at 363–64.
101. See SMYLIE, supra note 15, at 71–73.
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eas and influence the theology of those who dwelt in such remote
locales.102
The underlying dispute driving the split was PCUSA’s unwillingness
to relax its high formal education standards for the ordination of min-
isters in consideration of the difficulty frontier dwelling candidates for
ministry faced obtaining the required formal education.103 When the
Presbytery of Cumberland ordained candidates for ministry, despite
their lack of formal education, the Synod of Kentucky dissolved the
Presbytery of Cumberland.104 Left to its own devices, the former Pres-
bytery of Cumberland eventually developed into a separate denomi-
nation, the CPC.105
In 1903, the PCUSA modified its confession of faith to become
more accepting of charismatic ideas.106 The General Assembly of the
CPC felt that these modifications sufficiently resolved the CPC’s dif-
ferences with the PCUSA, and two-thirds of the CPC denomination
voted to reunite with the PCUSA. The dissenting one-third of the
CPC carried on its independent existence.107
Justice John Marshall Harlan, known as the “Great Dissenter”108 in
part for being the sole dissenter in Plessy v. Ferguson and the Civil
Rights Cases, was also a Ruling Elder of a PCUSA church when reun-
ion with the CPC was up for a vote.109 At this time, PCUSA was ra-
cially integrated at all levels except the congregational level, while the
CPC was still entirely segregated.110 The reunion proposal allowed the
CPC to remain segregated upon reuniting with the PCUSA, thus re-
quiring some Presbyteries and Synods to become re-segregated.111
Justice Harlan112 argued against the reunification because it would im-
pose segregation on part of the PCUSA.113
102. See About Us, CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, http://www.cumber-
land.org/center/CPC_Home_Page/About_Us.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
103. SMYLIE, supra note 15, at 72–73.
104. See PHILA.: PRESBYTERIAN BD. OF PUBL’N, MINUTES OF THE GENERAL AS-
SEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM
ITS ORGANIZATION A.D. 1789 TO A.D. 1820 INCLUSIVE 389 (Philadelphia, Presbyte-
rian Board of Publication 1847), https://archive.org/details/minutesofgeneral01phil.
105. See generally CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, supra note 102.
106. See generally BOOK OF CONFESSIONS, supra note 22, at 187–91.
107. SMYLIE, supra note 15, at 106.
108. See James W. Gordon, Religion and the First Justice Harlan: A Case Study in
Late Nineteenth Century Presbyterian Constitutionalism, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 317, 417
(2001).
109. Id. at 334.
110. Id. at 389.
111. See id. at 390.
112. Not to be confused with his grandson, John Marshall Harlan II, who also was a
Supreme Court Justice and whose concurrence first hinted at the neutral principles of
law method. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presby-
terian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 452 (1969) (Harlan J., concurring).
113. Gordon, supra note 108, at 390.
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Against this national background, a CPC congregation in Jefferson,
Texas, was divided over the reunification with the PCUSA. 114 Two
factions claimed possession of the local church property, the Session
of the CPC of Jefferson, Texas, and the Session of the PCUSA at Jef-
ferson, Texas.115 The Cumberland faction of the local church argued
that the General Assembly of the CPC lacked the authority to merge
with the PCUSA on the grounds that the confession of faith of the
CPC was antagonistic to the PCUSA’s confession of faith.116 The
Cumberland faction was essentially requesting the implementation of
the old English departure-from-doctrine rule, which the court prop-
erly declined to follow.117
The court did, however, engage in a thorough examination of how
the CPC national denomination was organized.118 The court delved
deeply into the composition of a Session, a Presbytery, a Synod, and
the General Assembly. Additionally, the court examined the jurisdic-
tion that each judicatory body had over various matters regarding
church administration.119 The court ultimately invoked Watson when
it deferred to the General Assembly of the CPC’s determination that
it had the authority to reunite with the PCUSA because the General
Assembly had original jurisdiction in matters concerning all CPC affil-
iated local churches in the nation.120 The court recognized that the
only question it had jurisdiction over was what effect the reunification
of the CPC and the PCUSA had on the Jefferson, Texas, church prop-
erty.121 The deed listed the holders as the trustees of the “Cumberland
Presbyterian Church at Jefferson, Tex,” and contained no trust or limi-
tation on the title. The court found that neither an express or implied
trust attached to the property.122
The court explained: “It follows, we think, as a natural and proper
conclusion, that the church to which the deed was made still owns the
property, and that whatever body is identified as being the church to
which the deed was made must still hold the title.”123 This quote
served as the basis of Texas’s identification methodology for the next
104 years. The reunion did not disband the local church, so the inci-
dental name change of the church did not affect the identity of the
114. See Brown v. Clark, 116 S.W. 360, 361–62 (Tex. 1909).
115. Id. at 361.
116. Id. at 363.
117. Id.
118. Brown, 116 S.W. at 361–63.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 363 (“The original jurisdiction of the General Assembly is limited by the
language in question to those things which belong to the churches in general and it
could not exercise authority over any matter which concerned only one church except
upon appeal.”).
121. Id. at 364.
122. Id. at 361.
123. Id. at 364–65.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\2-3\TWR303.txt unknown Seq: 17  4-DEC-15 10:43
2015] SURGICAL ARBITRATION 429
church regarding the deed to the property.124 Therefore, the court
held that the PCUSA at Jefferson, Texas, was the faction rightly enti-
tled to possession and use of the local church property.125
Even though Brown v. Clark would regularly be cited to show that
Texas common law always embraced the Watson hierarchical defer-
ence rule, the court in Brown examined the deed, searched for the
existence of any express or implied trust provisions, and thoroughly
examined the bureaucratic functions of the system of church govern-
ment as set out in the national denomination’s church constitution in-
stead.126 These actions are very similar to how the neutral- principles-
of-law method is applied in the post-Wolf era.127 While the court did
defer to the judicatory of the church’s determination that the PCUSA
church at Jefferson, Texas, was the rightful faction entitled to posses-
sion and use of the premises in question, it did not defer until after
determining that the CPC’s constitution made the General Assembly
the “supreme legislative, judicial, and executive” body of the church,
and that it had the “authority to adjudicate” matters concerning the
national church as a whole.128 So perhaps it is not so odd after all that
the Masterson court held that Brown demonstrated that Texas law had
always applied the neutral-principles-of-law method to hierarchical
church property disputes.129
b. Texas Presbyterian Church Cases in the Identification
Method Era
Two cases involving Presbyterian Church property disputes went
before Texas appellate courts in 1977 and 1986.130 These cases show
how the identification method functioned. Most Presbyterian
churches are held in a charitable trust.131 The trustees are elected
from the lay members of the congregation and the beneficiary is usu-
ally listed with only the name of the local church.132 When there is a
church property dispute, at least two different factions claim solely to
constitute the local church and be the beneficiaries of the trust enti-
tled to the use and possession of the church property.133 Using the
Watson hierarchical deference rule, a court defers the question of the
identity of the “true” local church to the appropriate higher ecclesias-
124. Brown, 116 S.W. at 365.
125. Id.
126. See generally id. at 360–65; see generally Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
127. See Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594, 605 (Tex. 2013).
128. Brown, 116 S.W. at 365.
129. See Masterson, 422 S.W.3d 594, 605–06.
130. Presbytery of the Covenant v. First Presbyterian Church of Paris, Inc., 552
S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1977, no writ); see generally Schismatic &
Purported Casa Linda Presbyterian Church in Am. v. Grace Union Presbytery, Inc.,
710 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
131. See supra note 28.
132. See generally supra note 130; see also supra note 27, at 61.
133. See supra note 132.
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tical body of the national denomination. In both of these instances,
that body is the presbytery because it has the sole power to create and
dissolve congregations according to the denomination’s
constitution.134
Each of these cases involved a Presbyterian Church in the United
States (“PCUS”) congregation dissociating to join the Presbyterian
Church in America (“PCA”). When the Civil War split the PCUSA
into four factions, the main southern faction styled itself as the Pres-
byterian Church in the Confederate States of America during the hos-
tilities.135 The other southern faction merged with the Presbyterian
Church in the Confederate States of America during the war. After
the Confederacy’s defeat, this southern half of the Presbyterian
Church became the PCUS.136
In 1954, when the PCUSA, PCUS, and the United Presbyterian
Church in North America (“UPCNA”)137 voted on a merger proposal,
the PCUS voted the proposal down at the presbytery level.138 The fact
that the PCUS voted against reunion the same year Brown v. Board of
Education ended segregation is no coincidence.139 The more conserva-
tive southern churches of the PCUS were uncomfortable with deseg-
regation, while the more progressive northern churches of the
PCUSA mostly welcomed desegregation with open arms. Though
PCUS rejected the reunification measure in 1954, the UPCNA and
PCUSA approved it and merged into the United Presbyterian Church
in the United States of America (“UPCUSA”) in 1958.140
Despite its more conservative tendencies, the PCUS generally
progressed parallel to the PCUSA on social issues, even though it
lagged several years behind. For example, PCUSA began ordaining
female ministers in 1956; PCUS followed suit in 1964.141 A significant
faction of the PCUS still desired reunification with the UPCUSA,142
while other more conservative factions within the PCUS were increas-
ingly distressed by the liberalization of the PCUS.143 These more con-
servative factions in the PCUS disapproved of the ordination of
134. See BOOK OF ORDER, supra note 24, at 52.
135. SMYLIE, supra note 15, at 89.
136. Id. at 89–91.
137. The UPCNA was another Presbyterian faction that also traces its roots back to
colonial times. UPCNA’s predecessors were established in the colonies with ties to
the Church of Scotland, while the Synod of Philadelphia (which became the PCUSA)
never had ties to the Church of Scotland. Id. at 82–83, 103.
138. Id. at 124.
139. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (holding “separate but
equal” unconstitutional).
140. SMYLIE, supra note 15, at 124.
141. Id. at 128.
142. See id. at 124.
143. See id. at 136.
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women and were alarmed by the scriptural standards espoused in the
UPCUSA’s Confession of 1967.144
In 1973, the PCUS discussed reunion with the UPCUSA once
again.145 Though the proposal did not result in reunification (despite
its addition of an “escape clause” to allow dissenting congregations to
opt-out of the reunion), the more conservative elements broke away
from the PCUS and formed the PCA, which held its inaugural Gen-
eral Assembly meeting on the 112th anniversary of the creation of the
Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America.146
Both the Paris, Texas and Casa Linda, Texas congregations were
able to secure a majority vote of their members in favor of disassociat-
ing from the PCUS and joining the PCA.147 Each congregation also
had a minority remnant that remained loyal to the PCUS.148 The
Paris, Texas congregation voted to disassociate in 1973 in an attempt
to be a part of the original PCA movement.149 The Casa Linda, Texas
congregation voted to disassociate in 1981, most likely in fear of the
impending reunification of the PCUS and UPCUSA that would occur
in 1983.150 More significant than motive, the timing of these two suits
also places the Paris, Texas suit two years before Wolf and the Casa
Linda, Texas suit a few years after Wolf.
The trial court found for the disassociating majority in the Paris,
Texas suit.151 On appeal, the appellate court first determined that the
Paris, Texas, church was a member of the PCUS.152 The court then
determined that PCUS was a hierarchical denomination because an
“ascending order of ecclesiastical judicatories” governed it.153 The
court then examined the PCUS church constitution and determined
that the Presbytery was the judicatory body with the power to create
and dissolve congregations.154 The court utilized the identification
method by deferring the matter of identification to the Presbytery be-
144. Id.
145. See id. at 136–37.
146. See R. Milton Winter, Division & Reunion in the Presbyterian Church, U.S.: A
Mississippi Retrospective, 78 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. 1, 77–78 (2000), http://www.jstor
.org/stable/23335299.
147. See Presbytery of the Covenant v. First Presbyterian Church of Paris, Inc., 552
S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1977, no writ); Schismatic & Purported
Casa Linda Presbyterian Church in Am. v. Grace Union Presbytery, Inc., 710 S.W.2d
700, 702 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
148. Presbytery of the Covenant, 552 S.W.2d at 870; Casa Linda, 710 S.W.2d at 703.
149. See Presbytery of the Covenant, 552 S.W.2d at 869.
150. Casa Linda, 710 S.W.2d at 702.
151. Presbytery of the Covenant, 552 S.W.2d at 867.
152. Id. at 868.
153. Id.
154. Id. (“The Presbytery alone has power to organize new churches, receive and
dismiss churches, and dissolve churches, as well as to ordain, receive, dismiss, install,
remove and judge ministers.”).
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cause it was the appropriate ecclesiastical authority.155 The Presbytery
identified the loyal remnant as the true congregation; therefore, the
disassociating majority was free to leave the PCUS but could not take
the church property.156
In the Casa Linda suit, the trial court found for the minority loyal to
the PCUS and the majority appealed, claiming that Wolf required the
court to use the neutral-principles-of-law method instead of the Wat-
son hierarchical deference rule.157 The appellate court held this asser-
tion to be incorrect, holding that while Wolf allowed a state to use the
neutral-principles-of-law method in a hierarchical church property dis-
pute, it did not require it.158 Therefore, because Texas jurisprudence
always adhered to the Watson hierarchical deference rule, the court
would continue to do so until the Texas Supreme Court held other-
wise.159 The trial court’s ruling was affirmed and the PCUS minority
retained the use and possession of the church property.
c. Texas resurrects the neutral-principles-of-law method for
hierarchical church property disputes.
In 2013, the Texas Supreme Court weighed in on the matter of the
neutral-principles-of-law method option with regard to hierarchical
denominations presented to the states by the Supreme Court in Jones
v. Wolf.160  Oral arguments for two cases, both involving splits in the
Episcopal Church, were heard by the Texas Supreme Court on the
155. See id. at 871 (stating that the “faction . . . entitled to the property . . . is
determined by which of the two factions adheres to or is sanctioned by the appropri-
ate governing body of the organization.”).
156. Id. (“It is a simple question of identity.”).
157. Schismatic & Purported Casa Linda Presbyterian Church in Am. v. Grace
Union Presbytery, Inc., 710 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d
n.r.e.).
158. Id. at 704.
159. Id. at 707.
160. See generally Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2013);
Texas has consistently applied neutral principles of law in church property disputes
within denominations with congregational polities. See generally First Baptist Church
of Paris v. Fort, 54 S.W. 892, 896 (Tex. 1900) (holding in a congregational church
ultimate authority vests in the members); see also Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d
783, 793 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ) (holding if neutral principles of law do not
resolve a controversy in a congregational church the court must defer to the majority
vote of the congregation); see also Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (holding courts do have jurisdiction to review matters in-
volving civil, contract, or property rights even though they stem from a church contro-
versy in congregational churches); see also Hawkins v. Friendship Missionary Baptist
Church, 69 S.W.3d 756, 759 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (holding
neutral principles of law cannot be applied to a congregational church where no gov-
erning documents exist as well as denying the authority of the congregation’s majority
vote); see also Smith v. N. Texas Dist. Council of Assemblies of God & House of
Grace, No. 2-05-425-CV, 2006 WL 3438077, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 30,
2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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same day.161 The Episcopal splits were motivated by the Episcopal
Church’s consecration of a homosexual bishop and ordination of ho-
mosexual ministers.162 In Masterson, a local parish of the Episcopal
Church sought to leave both its diocese as well as its national denomi-
nation.163 In Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, an entire diocese
sought to disassociate from the Episcopal Church.164
The court cited Wolf as requiring the use of the neutral-principles-
of-law method to determine where the authority to make property
decisions resides within a religious institution, and then to enforce the
decision of the religious authority.165 The court then cited
Miliovojevich to differentiate how the neutral-principles-of-law meth-
odology functions based on the subject matter it is applied to.166
Courts must show absolute deference to the national denomination on
matters such as membership and the ordination of clergy; however,
matters such as property ownership and trust law should be “based on
the same neutral principles of secular law that apply to other
entities.”167
In Masterson, the court conducted an intense reexamination of
Brown in light of later U.S. Supreme Court decisions.168 The court
determined that Brown had in fact properly applied the neutral-prin-
ciples-of-law methodology, and further, that the Texas Constitution
obligated the courts “to apply neutral principles of law to issues such
as land titles, trusts, and corporate formation, governance, and disso-
lution, even when religious entities are involved.”169 Finally, the court
stated that in order to prevent additional confusion in an already con-
fusing area of law, Texas courts must only apply the neutral-principles-
of-law method to church property disputes.170
Having enshrined Texas’s place with the majority of jurisdictions,171
the Texas Supreme Court then remanded both cases to the trial courts
with some guidance as to how those courts should proceed.172
161. Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth v. Episcopal Church, 422 S.W.3d 646, 649
(Tex. 2013).
162. Matthew Waller, Anglican Church in Lawsuit Limbo, STANDARD TIMES (Jan.
20, 2010, 9:26 PM), http://www.gosanangelo.com/lifestyle/anglican-church-in-lawsuit-
limbo; Jim Jones, Ruling Expected Soon in Episcopal Diocese Dispute, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM (Feb. 25, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/
article11176544.html.
163. Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 596.
164. See Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, 422 S.W.3d at 648.
165. Id. at 650.
166. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U. S. of Am. & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976).
167. Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, 422 S.W.3d at 650.
168. Masterson, 422 S.W.3d 594, 604–07.
169. Id. at 606.
170. Id. at 607.
171. Id. at 606 n.6.
172. Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, 422 S.W.3d at 652–53.
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i. Remand of Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth
On March 2, 2015, the 141st Tarrant County District Court ordered
that the Defendant’s Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
be granted.173 The arguments advanced in the Defendant’s Second
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is an available viewpoint to see
how the neutral-principles-of-law method in hierarchical church prop-
erty disputes is being applied in Texas so far, because it resolved all
the identity of the titleholder in forty nine out of fifty parish
properties.174
Prior to the dispute, the Diocese of Fort Worth (“Diocese”) consti-
tuted two legal entities—an unincorporated non-profit association and
a non-profit corporation.175 The non-profit corporation was formed to
hold title and control real property used by the Diocese.176 The defen-
dant in Salazar asserted that all of the real property was purchased,
built, and maintained by donations from within the Diocese or its
predecessor.177 The non-profit corporation, chaired by Bishop Iker,
motivated by its perception of the national denomination’s substantial
deviation from doctrine by ordaining homosexual ministers, amended
its certificate of formation and bylaws to remove any reference to the
national denomination.178 The Diocese also amended its constitution
to remove any references to the national denomination.179 For the
amendments to be properly conducted according to the Diocese’s con-
stitution, votes were held at two separate conventions in 2007 and
2008, respectively.180 An overwhelming majority of both conventions
approved the amendments.181
In response, the national denomination excommunicated the bishop
of the breakaway diocese.182 The national denomination never con-
tended that the non-profit corporation did not hold title to the proper-
173. The motion is partial because the judge decided that facts pertaining to one
parish in particular would need to be resolved at trial. Defendants’ Third Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Relating to All Saints Episcopal Church at 1, The Episco-
pal Church v. Salazar, No. 141-252083-11 (141st Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex. Mar. 2,
2015).
174. See Defendants’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 46-48, Epis-
copal Church v. Salazar, No. 141-252083-11 (141st Dist. Ct., Tarrant Cnty., Tex. Mar.
2, 2015).
175. Id. at 3.
176. Id. at 7.
177. Id. at 6–7 (explaining Diocese of Fort Worth was divided from Diocese of
Dallas in November 1982).
178. S. C. Gwynne, Bishop Takes Castle, TEX. MONTHLY, (February 2010), http://
www.texasmonthly.com/story/bishop-takes-castle.
179. See supra note 174.
180. Defendants’ Second Motion, No. 141-252083-11 at 7–8.
181. Id. (“83% of clergy, 77% of lay delegates”).
182. In re Salazar, 315 S.W.3d 279, 281 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.).
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ties,183 but instead claimed that the minority loyal to the national
denomination constituted the true corporation and Diocese, thus com-
plicating the identity crisis with two dioceses, two corporations, and
potentially 100 parishes.184 In an attempt to accomplish this, the pre-
siding bishop of the national denomination called a special convention
of the Diocese attended only by the minority who had voted against
the amendments to the constitution.185
At this meeting, the minority loyal to the national denomination
voted to undo the amendments to the constitution, declared all of the
seats on the board to be vacant, and elected Gulick as the provisional
bishop of the loyal Diocese. Gulick then replaced all positions of the
non-profit corporation with his own appointees and retained attorneys
to file suit against the breakaway Diocese.186
The defendant asserted that, under Texas law, the manner of elect-
ing a board of directors is determined by either the certificate of for-
mation or bylaws of the corporation, with the certificate of formation
controlling in the event of discrepancy.187 The non-profit corpora-
tion’s bylaws specified that one director must be elected to the board
per year; a candidate for director is eligible only if a member of the
Diocese; a director may resign by submitting written notice to the
board; a director may only be removed by a majority vote of the
board; and temporary vacancies can only be filled by a majority vote
of the board.188
Therefore, when representatives of the national denomination de-
clared the board vacant and filled all board positions simultaneously,
none of the previous directors were actually removed and none of the
national denomination’s purported directors were elected according
to the bylaws.189 The actions of the national denomination not only
failed to affect the corporation, but are not provided for in the na-
tional denomination’s own constitution.190
The defendant challenged the validity of the Dennis Canon under
Texas trust law and asserted it lacked the signed writing required by
the statute of frauds.191 Even if the trust was otherwise valid, the
183. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment at 1, The Episcopal Church v. Salazar, (141st Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex.
Mar. 2, 2015) (No. 141-252083-11).
184. Due to identity crisis multiplication, assuming that each parish had at least one
member loyal to the national denomination.
185. Defendants’ Second Motion, No. 141-252083-11 at 24–25.
186. Salazar, 315 S.W.3d at 281–82 (holding plaintiff’s attorneys failed to demon-
strate the proper authority required under Texas Civil Procedure Rule 12 to bring the
suit).
187. Defendants’ Second Motion, No. 141-252083-11 at 23–24.
188. Id. at 19–20.
189. Id. at 24.
190. Id. at 25
191. GEN. CONVENTION OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, CONSTITUTION & CANONS 41
(2009), http://www.episcopalarchives.org/CandC_2009.pdf (“All real and personal
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wording of the Dennis Canon does not expressly state that it is irrevo-
cable.192 Under Texas law, a trust is revocable unless specifically
stated to be irrevocable; therefore, the breakaway Diocese was able to
revoke any hypothetical trust at any time.193 In the event the trust was
not revoked, the defendant advanced an alternative argument that the
corporation had held and controlled all of the real property for more
than twenty-five years, and thus, would adversely possess title to the
properties in question.194
The plaintiff’s response hinged on the premise that when the Dio-
cese disaffiliated with The Episcopal Church (“TEC”), it ceased to
exist, and only those designated by TEC afterward were the true “Di-
ocese and Congregations.”195 Plaintiff argued that control of the cor-
poration was irrelevant because the corporation holds the property in
trust for the benefit of the Diocese and Congregations.196 Even so,
plaintiff argued the corporation’s 2006 bylaws provision conditioned
board eligibility on being a member of the Diocese.197 Even under the
neutral-principles-of-law method, courts still must defer to a national
denomination’s determination of polity or leadership.198 The plaintiff
contended that the court must defer to the national denomination’s
determination that the board of directors were not members of the
Diocese, and therefore, they were ineligible to sit upon the board of
directors under the corporation’s bylaws.199 This argument was an at-
tempt to manipulate the language of the Texas Supreme Court into
preserving the deference regime rather than expressly establishing
that the neutral-principles-of-law method applies to hierarchical
church property disputes.
The most obvious flaw in this reasoning is that in 2006 the break-
away Diocese and its bishop were still members in good standing
when they amended the certificate of formation and bylaws of the cor-
property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in
trust for this Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or Con-
gregation is located. The existence of this trust, however, shall in no way limit the
power and authority of the Parish, Mission or Congregation otherwise existing over
such property so long as the particular Parish, Mission or Congregation remains a part
of, and subject to, this Church and its Constitution and Canons.”); Defendants’ Sec-
ond Motion, No. 141-252083-11, at 44; see also TEX. PROP CODE ANN. § 112.004
(West 2015).
192. Defendants’ Second Motion, No. 141-252083-11, at 44.
193. Id. (“[The Diocese] revoked any trust for TEC in 1989 . . . ”).
194. Id. at 36; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.024–16.028 (West
2015).
195. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment at 24, The Episcopal Church v. Salazar, (141st Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex.
Mar. 2, 2015) (No. 141-252083-11).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 56.
198. Id. at 39.
199. Id. at 59–62.
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poration.200 As the plaintiffs admitted, the corporation held title in
trust for the Diocese and parishes at that time.201 After the split, the
Diocese allowed several parishes to leave that did not approve the
action.202 Even if not every member of each parish agreed with the
disassociation, as long as the majority of a parish agreed then the cor-
poration was still faithful in its fiduciary duty to the parishes. The only
entity removed from the paradigm was the TEC, which was never es-
tablished as a beneficiary of the corporation’s valid trust.
The national denomination advanced several interesting theories
based on old cases, including the contractual trust theory, and insisted
local chapters of national organizations cannot disassociate from the
national organization and keep their property.203 However, the facts
of these cases do not line up squarely with the current situation, and
most profoundly, these arguments essentially ignore the Texas Su-
preme Court’s guidance on how to proceed in these matters.
So far, the application of the neutral-principles-of-law method to
hierarchical church property disputes in Texas seems to have borne
out that the Dennis Canon is an insufficient instrument to unilaterally
claim an interest in real property. The application of Texas corpora-
tion law to the operation of a non-profit corporation via its certificate
of formation and bylaws holds more weight in a hierarchical church
property dispute than a national denomination’s constitution. As of
the writing of this Comment, a trial on the merits for the issue of the
remaining parish remains to be resolved. There is little doubt the na-
tional denomination will appeal this grant of partial summary judg-
ment to the appellate court. For the time being, however, it appears
that the breakaway Diocese has won the day.
ii. Implications for the PC(USA) in Texas
Though many previously PC(USA)-affiliated local churches have
broken with the national denomination in Texas,204 the specific facts
of a local church’s disaffiliation from the PC(USA) have now been
tested under Texas’s neutral-principles-of-law regime. It seemed that
200. See supra note 174.
201. See supra note 195.
202. Defendants’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 8, Episcopal
Church v. Salazar, No. 141-252083-11 (141st Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex. Mar. 2,
2015) (“Three parishes took advantage of the offer, and in February 2009 the Corpo-
ration transferred property to them.”).
203. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment at 70–73, The Episcopal Church v. Salazar, (141st Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex.
Mar. 2, 2015) (No. 141-252083-11); see also Shellberg v. Shellberg, 459 S.W.2d 465,
470–71 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Dist. Grand
Lodge No. 25 Grand United Order of Odd Fellows v. Jones, 160 S.W.2d 915, 921 (Tex.
1942).
204. Presbyterian Lay Committee, Churches that are seeking to leave or have left the
PCUSA, LAYMAN (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.layman.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
08/churches-seeking-discernment.pdf.
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the first case to do so would have been Windwood,205 which was re-
manded to the trial court for resolution in accordance with the neu-
tral-principles-of-law method; however, PC(USA) and Windwood
Presbyterian Church reached a settlement prior to trial.206 Some have
alleged PC(USA) settled in order to avoid a precedential ruling
against the validity of a portion of PC(USA)’s Book of Order.207
On the surface, the facts seem analogous to those in Episcopal Dio-
cese of Fort Worth. In both cases, the split occurred at the hierarchical
level where title was held; the titleholder was a non-profit corporation
formed under Texas law,208 and the corporate documents were
amended to remove any reference to the national denomination.209
PC(USA) has a provision in its constitution worded similarly to the
Dennis Canon known as the Trust Clause.210 The only real difference
between the Dennis Canon and the Trust Clause is the specification
that the national denomination holds a trust, despite the type of entity
“title [to the local church property] is lodged in.”211 Since the initial
writing of this Comment, a Texas trial court held that the Trust Clause
does not constitute a valid trust under Texas law.212 The language of
205. Windwood Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 438
S.W.3d 597 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
206. Paula R. Kincaid, With no exchange of money, Texas church gets clear title to
its property, LAYMAN (April 15, 2015), http://www.layman.org/with-no-exchange-of-
money-texas-church-gets-clear-title-to-its-property/; see also Windwood Presbyterian
Church, Inc. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), No. 200853684 (Harris Cnty. Dist.
Court filed Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/eDocs/Public/Search.aspx?
Tab=tabCivil.
207. Kincaid, supra note 206 (illustrating the comments in the discussion forum).
208. Windwood, 438 S.W.3d at 599.
209. Id. at 600.
210. Id. at 599–600; see also BOOK OF CONFESSIONS, supra note 22, at 62 (“All
property held by or for a particular church, a presbytery, a synod, the General Assem-
bly, or the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A), whether legal title is lodged in a corporation,
a trustee or trustees, or an unincorporated association, and whether the property is
used in programs of a particular church or of a more inclusive governing body or
retained for the production of income, is held in trust nevertheless for the use and
benefit of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A).”).
211. Compare supra note 191, with supra note 210.
212. First Amended Final Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction, First
Presbyterian Church of Houston v. Presbytery of New Covenant, Inc., No. 2014-30354
(234th Dist. Ct., Harris Cnty., Tex. Feb. 16, 2015) (“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
that the trust and other property interest claims asserted by Presbytery of New Cove-
nant, Inc., including pursuant to G-4 0203 (formerly G-8 0201) of the PCUSA Book of
Order, G-4 0204 (formerly G-8 0301) of the PCUSA Book of Order, G-4 0205 (for-
merly G-8 0401) of the PCUSA Book of Order and Chapter 6 of the 1982/83 edition
and previous editions of the PCUS Book of Church Order, are unenforceable and
without legal force and effect as to said Personal and Real Property, and that neither
the Presbytery of New Covenant, Inc nor any person, entity, administrative unit,
agency, commission, committee, or governing body acting on behalf of the Presbytery
of New Covenant, Inc or in its stead, or claiming by, through or under it, has any
right, title or interest in or to the Personal and Real Property, whether in trust or
otherwise, express or implied, nor any right, express or implied, to determine or con-
trol, directly or indirectly, the use, ownership or disposition of the Personal and Real
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the Trust Clause, without the local church’s written assent as required
by the statute of frauds, is not sufficient to form an irrevocable trust
under Texas law.213
One remote possibility, considering the Texas Supreme Court’s rul-
ing that the neutral-principles-of-law method has in fact been the law
of Texas governing hierarchical church property disputes since Brown,
is that the hierarchical church property dispute cases decided under
the identification method could theoretically be reheard by the Texas
Supreme Court. If the Texas Supreme Court finds that Texas courts
applying the wrong law for over a century is an “exceptional” circum-
stance (even though the appropriate time-table for a motion for re-
hearing is long exhausted), the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
provide that the Texas Supreme Court could potentially act on such a
motion if it so desired.214 However, it is extremely unlikely the Texas
Supreme Court would elect to act upon any such motion due to the
judicial havoc that would ensue.
III. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES AND CHANGES TO THE NEUTRAL-
PRINCIPLES-OF-LAW METHOD
Numerous scholars have critiqued the neutral-principles-of-law
method and have proposed alterations or alternatives to ameliorate
the doctrine’s perceived shortcomings.215 Some of these proposals in-
clude enacting a federal statute, adopting a church-constitution-cen-
tered approach, adopting the strict-neutral-principals approach, and
fully embracing alternative dispute resolution.
A. Federal statute normalizing application of neutral principles
lacks public policy benefit to justify undermining
the federalist system.
The neutral-principles-of-law method is often criticized because its
application produces different results for the same national denomina-
tion in different jurisdictions. One commentator argues that national
denominations deserve a federal statute standardizing the application
of the neutral-principals-of-law method in church property disputes
across the nation.216 The commentator’s rationale is essentially that
the burden a national denomination incurs by having to comply with
the laws of each state where it has an affiliated local church is so oner-
Property, including particularly the immovable Property described in the attached Ex-
hibit A.”).
213. Id.
214. “But in exceptional cases, if justice so requires, the Court may . . . act on a
motion any time after it is filed.” TEX. R. APP. P. 64.3.
215. See generally infra Part.III.
216. Brian Schmalzbach, Note, Confusion and Coercion in Church Property Litiga-
tion, 96 VA. L. REV. 443, 444 (2010).
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ous that all state laws relevant to a church property dispute should be
preempted by a federal statute to mitigate that burden.217
The Constitution established a federalist system with horizontal and
vertical separation of powers.218 A benefit of federalism is that it al-
lows the will of the citizens of one state to be better implemented
through the representatives in their state legislature than in Congress,
because a state’s citizenry has more proximate access to its state legis-
lature than to the federal legislature.219 Determining who holds an in-
terest in real property is possibly the most traditional state power.220
The proposed federal statute’s preemption of state real property law
(as well as all state laws relevant to church property disputes) impacts
not only the free exercise rights of local church congregations, but also
undermines the federalist structure provided by the Constitution.221
The reasons national denominations require protection via federal
statute are:222 (1) most of the local churches belonging to national de-
nominations were organized while Watson was the law of the land;223
(2) the national denominations failed to establish separate express
trust agreements with each local church because they reasonably re-
lied on the Watson ruling;224 (3) the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wolf
“pulled the rug out from under the national churches”;225 and (4) the
establishment of separate express trust agreements with each local
217. Id.
218. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1441–51 (1987).
219. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 321 (2003)
(“The smaller the polity in geography and in population, the easier it is for the people
(1) to monitor what their government is doing, (2) to criticize or praise, and therefore
(3) to affect public policy. The people’s need to monitor arises because the system is
representative, rather than a direct democracy. Federalism makes it easier for the
people to monitor issues that are properly under local control, while it places those
issues that must be governed at a federal level in the hands of more distant
representatives.”).
220. Thompson v. Maxwell, 95 U.S. 391, 399 (1877) (stating an action to quiet title
promotes the peace of society and the security of property); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (defining police powers as “existing in the sovereignty of each
state” and relating to, among other things, the general welfare of public; property is
held on conditions imposed by the state in the exercise of police powers).
221. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Prop-
erty belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so con-
strued as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”);
Wilcox v. Jackson ex dem. McConnel, 38 U.S. 498, 516 (“A state has a perfect right to
legislate as she may please in regard to the remedies to be prosecuted in her Courts;
and to regulate the disposition of the property of her citizens, by descent, devise, or
alienation.”).
222. Schmalzbach, supra note 216, at 447.
223. Id. at 471.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 446.
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church is too burdensome on the national denominations.226 The com-
mentator insists that if the national denominations had known express
trust agreements might “someday” be required, then the national de-
nominations “would have made the appropriate legal arrangements”
upon organizing their local churches.227
This detrimental reliance justification is flawed in several respects.
First, it presupposes most hierarchical local churches were organized
prior to Wolf. Second, it alleges that Watson caused local churches not
to seek express trust agreements. Third, it asserts that the national
denominations had no notice that the neutral-principles-of-law
method could be applied to hierarchical church property disputes.
Fourth, the claim that complying with state law is too difficult is an
insufficient excuse given the multiple regional levels of administrative
strata that comprise a hierarchical denomination by its very definition.
First, while the assumption that most hierarchical congregations
were organized prior to 1979 may prove true for the Protestant Epis-
copal Church,228 it will not stand up for several hierarchical denomi-
nations,229 including the Presbyterian Church. In illustrating the
adverse effects of the neutral-principles-of-law methodology, the com-
mentator uses two national denominations as examples, the “Protes-
tant Episcopal Church and the United Presbyterian Church [sic].”230
The commentator devotes an entire subsection to the “United Presby-
terian Church of the USA” and refers to the UPCUSA throughout,
even while citing to the PC(USA)’s church constitution.231 Admit-
tedly, the history and taxonomy of the Presbyterian Church is confus-
ing.232 Unfortunately, this oversight is fatal to the justification of the
commentator’s argument.
The UPCUSA ceased to exist when it reunited with the PCUS in
1983 to form the PC(USA)—four years after Wolf was decided. When
this occurred, many local congregations had the option of leaving
226. Id. at 448.
227. Id. at 471.
228. Episcopal Congregations Overview: Findings from the 2010 Faith Communities
Today Survey, EPISCOPAL CHURCH (Mar. 2011), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/files/
episcopal_overview_fact_2010.pdf (“A majority (53%) of Episcopal parishes and mis-
sions were founded before 1901”).
229. Evangelical Lutheran Church in America was founded in 1988, therefore none
of its 9,846 congregations were organized in the Watson era. Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America, History, ELCA, http://www.elca.org/en/About/History (last vis-
ited Mar. 25, 2015); The United Methodist Church has organized 2,709 congregations
since 1979. E-mail from Lauren S. Arieux, Statistician and Research Fellow, GCFA
Data Services, to David Fulton (Mar. 25, 2015, 11:30 AM) (on file with author).
230. Schmalzbach, supra note 216, at 444.
231. “The UPCUSA’s [sic] constitution now provides that ‘[a]ll property held by
or for a particular church . . . is held in trust nevertheless for the use and benefit
of [UPCUSA] [sic].’ Id. at 454; ‘CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH
(U.S.A.), PART II: BOOK OF ORDER, G-8.0200 (2009), http://www.pcusa.org/oga/publi
cations/boo07-09.pdf.’” Id. at 454 n.42.
232. See supra note 15.
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through the Article 13 escape clause, but every local church would
have been required to execute significant paperwork to formalize the
transition. The nationwide reorganization of a “new” national denom-
ination is a convenient opportunity to execute express trust agree-
ments with each local congregation. The timing of this nationwide
reorganization gave the PC(USA) ample notice of the possibility of
local church property being subject to the neutral-principles-of-law
methodology in the future, yet no express trust agreements were exe-
cuted. As far as the commentator’s contention that most local
churches of national denominations were organized during the Wat-
son era, all of the PC(USA) congregations were organized during the
Wolf era and therefore cannot be said to have reasonably relied on
Watson for protection.
Second, Watson did not prohibit denominations from executing ex-
press trust agreements on local church property.233 Given that many
express trust agreements were executed between elected bodies of
trustees for the benefit of the a local church congregation during this
time, it would not have been so alien an option as to never cross the
mind of a reasonable administrator of a national denomination.
Third, the commentator’s characterization implies that the denomi-
nations had no notice of the possibility that the neutral-principles-of-
law method might one day be applied to the adjudication of a hierar-
chical church property dispute. The Watson Court contemplated three
possible dispositions of church property disputes, of which two would
essentially result in the application of the neutral-principles-of-law
method by examining the deed, looking for express trusts, and possi-
bly by majority vote of the congregation.234 The fact that the Court
underscored the stringency of its obligation to enforce express trust
agreements that restrict doctrinal practice on church property should
have put the national denominations on notice that their legal position
would be strengthened by having an express trust.235
Beyond the language of Watson itself, as early as 1929, national de-
nominations were on notice that, under certain circumstances, the
court might apply the neutral-principles-of-law method even to
“purely ecclesiastical” matters.236 Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Blue
Hull gave the national denominations a decade of notice that the juris-
233. See generally Watson v Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872).
234. Id. at 722.
235. Id. at 722–23 (“. . . when the property . . . is held, by the express terms of the
instrument devoted to the teaching, support, or spread of some specific form of relig-
ious doctrine or belief . . . the obvious duty of the court [is] to see that the property so
dedicated is not diverted from the trust which is thus attached to its use.”).
236. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)
(stating a fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness exception to court deference in purely ec-
clesiastical matters).
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prudential winds were beginning to blow towards the big bad Wolf.237
Regarding local churches in Texas, the national denominations had
thirty-four years of incontrovertible notice after Wolf before being
subjected to the application of the neutral-principles-of-law method in
that jurisdiction.
Finally, the claim that it would be too difficult for a national denom-
ination to comply with a state’s law is weak considering the multiple,
regionally distributed levels of administrative bodies that comprise the
very structure of a hierarchal denomination. A hierarchical body cor-
responding to a Synod should be able to acquire legal advice regard-
ing the property laws of the states it shares a federal circuit with. At
the very least, the chief level of a national denomination could acquire
representation to discover the state laws most adverse to its policies
and formulate a national standard that would comply with even the
most demanding jurisdiction.238
While the commentator addresses the implied trusts contained in
the church constitutions of some national denominations, the valid ex-
press charitable trusts, under which title to local church property is
held are not addressed. If the statute overrode the preexisting valid
express trust, then there might be a regulatory takings issue in addi-
tion to the issue of preemption. If the federal statute merely modified
the existing state laws to add the national denomination as a benefici-
ary in addition to the local church, the non-profit corporation trustee
would be exposed to liability in the event the interests of the two ben-
eficiaries diverge, thereby forcing the trustee to breach its fiduciary
duty to either one or the other.
The commentator proposes a federal statute be passed that
“preempts state statutory and common law [regarding] church prop-
erty disputes” to replace state laws with a rule that would grant the
national church with “beneficial ownership” of local church prop-
erty—that the national church does not hold title to—if the national
church amends its constitution to include a trust provision.239 It is as-
serted that this would be a “recognizable form” of the neutral-princi-
ples-of-law method.240 Far from it, this rule would actually function as
237. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 452 (1969) (Harlan J., concurring) (“I do not, however, read the
Court’s opinion to go further to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids civilian
courts from enforcing a deed or will which expressly and clearly lays down conditions
limiting a religious organization’s use of the property which is granted . . . In such a
case, the church should not be permitted to keep the property simply because church
authorities have determined that the doctrinal innovation is justified by the faith’s
basic principles.”).
238. A leaked legal strategy memo outlining those very things demonstrates the
feasibility of the concept. See generally Memorandum from the Presbyterian Church
(USA) on Church Property Disputes (Dec. 2005), http://www.layman.org/Files/legal-
strategy-memo.pdf.
239. Schmalzbach, supra note 216, at 470.
240. Id.
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a reincarnation of the Watson hierarchical deference rule. Upholding
trust provisions unilaterally created by a national denomination
amending its constitution, without the written consent of the current
titleholder, is essentially deferring decisions on the issue of property
ownership to the denomination.241
The commentator’s main contention with the neutral-principles-of-
law method is that it interferes with the national church’s free exercise
rights by “pressuring” it to either change its property management
system or its governmental structure.242 The commentator allows that
“there is a colorable argument that [the proposed statute] violates the
free exercise rights of parishes by making it too easy for national de-
nominations to take ownership of parish property.”243 The proposed
language of this statute reads “[a] supercongregational church can es-
tablish the existence of such a trust through statements in the deed to
the property, provisions in the local church charter or articles of incor-
poration, or provisions in the supercongregational church’s constitu-
tion or canons . . .” (emphasis added).244 The “or” is fairly significant
because an express trust for the local church on any of the documents
listed could be overridden or modified by the national denomination’s
unilateral amendment of the church constitution.
The commentator’s proposed federal statute may prevent national
denominations from “being coerced into adopting forms of govern-
ance that are not traditionally and doctrinally their own.”245 Consider-
ing that church property disputes typically originate in reaction to
what the local churches perceive as the national denomination’s dras-
tic change in doctrine, the burden is merely shifted to the local church,
who will likely feel coerced into accepting doctrine not traditionally its
own.
Either outcome in a church property dispute will impact the free-
exercise rights of the loser to some degree. On the one hand, the free-
exercise rights exercised by ecclesiastical administrators spiritually
guiding a local church as part of a national denomination will be nega-
tively impacted to some degree if the local church is allowed to leave
with its property. On the other hand, rousting the congregation of the
local church from its house of worship will negatively impact its free-
exercise rights if the national denomination is allowed to prevail on a
trust claim that would be invalid in any other circumstance. The in-
fringement of the local congregation’s free-exercise rights would be
compounded by a potential Fifth Amendment infringement because
of the seizure of its interest in real property without compensation, by
state-action, for the unjust enrichment of a private party. Even if the
241. Id. at 446.
242. Id. at 471.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 470.
245. Id. at 471.
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regulatory takings issue was resolved, the local congregation still must
bear the certain economic and emotional harm that will accompany
such a loss. The local congregation must also endure the dilution of its
representation by the state legislature due to the preemption of state
statutes validly enacted by its state legislators. The scale of burdens
weighs heavily against the local church. Merely tossing the conve-
nience of standardized resolution of church property disputes on the
national denomination’s side of the scale certainly would not balance
it, and it is doubtful it would even jostle it.
B. Church-constitution-centered approach is inherently biased
against local churches.
Another proposed solution involves shifting the order and emphasis
with which a court examines documents under the neutral-principles-
of-law method.246 The first step in this solution is to eliminate the op-
tion of Watson hierarchical deference entirely.247 Then, the neutral-
principles-of-law method’s implementation would be modified so that
a court first considers only the national denomination’s constitu-
tion.248 A court could only follow the neutral-principles-of-law
method if the language of a national denomination’s constitution al-
lowed the court to do so.249
Much like the Watson Court, the commentator posits three possible
outcomes.250 The church constitution: (1) expressly requires deference
in church property disputes; (2) dictates what documents may be con-
sidered by courts in church property disputes; or (3) fails to suffi-
ciently state what documents may be considered by courts in church
property disputes.251 In the first instance, a court must defer to the
national denomination, despite the previous elimination of the Watson
hierarchical deference rule. In the second instance, a court is bound to
only consider the documents specified by the national church. In the
third instance, a court has permission to apply the neutral-principles-
of-law methodology.252
The first two instances are intended to be governed by state con-
tract law.253 The first question, then, is did the local church manifest
the intent to enter into a contract waiving its property rights at the
246. Alderman, supra note 10, at 1029–30.
247. Id. at 1055.
248. Id. at 1056.
249. Id. at 1057 (“Depending on the contents of the constitution . . . a court might
be able to consider other documents, such as deeds and statutes, in further steps of its
analysis.”).
250. Id. at 1060–61.
251. Id. at 1057–60.
252. Id. at 1060.
253. Id.; see generally id. at 1057 (“This appears to be a reversion back to the defer-
ence approach, which has already been eliminated under this system, but it is actually
just an enforcement of a contract between the church and the denomination.”).
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time it joined the national denomination? If the local church was un-
willing to execute an express trust in its property, by naming the na-
tional denomination as a beneficiary, then it is unlikely it manifested
the intent to do so merely by joining the national denomination.
In Texas, a trust in real property is only enforceable if its terms are
in writing and signed.254 As mentioned previously, most church
properties are already held by a non-profit corporation in a charitable
trust.255 The modification of the preexisting trust to identify the na-
tional denomination as an additional beneficiary would require more
than the local church merely assenting to join the national denomina-
tion. The same previously discussed conflicts of fiduciary interest
would arise if this resulted in adding the national denomination as a
beneficiary.256 If the modification removed the local church as a bene-
ficiary, it would possibly implicate the takings clause, along with the
rest of the “parade of horribles” marched out in the previous
subsection.257
The second instance gives the national denomination far too much
power. For example, if the national denomination specified the only
document to be considered was Exhibit A, and Exhibit A merely said
“trustees and beneficiaries of the local church hereby revoke the char-
itable trust in local church property and convey that property to na-
tional denomination in fee simple absolute”—would that be
acceptable? It seems egregious that a party to a lawsuit would have
the power to dictate how a court does its job.
As the commentator admits, if enacted, the proposal’s core problem
is that the proposed solution will likely encourage national denomina-
tions to amend their constitutions to include an express trust agree-
ment and therefore usher in a “de facto deference regime.”258 The
commentator also admits that, under a deference regime, “decisions
will never be reached in favor of the local church or the dissenting
faction because the general judicatory will never find against itself.”259
Even though the commentator claims the grievances of both sides will
not go unheard, a local church’s arguments are futile if the national
denomination has the power to write the rules. When facing a trust
provision that would be invalid in any other circumstance, the church-
constitution-centered approach values consistent findings in favor of
the national denomination over a local church’s right to a remedy
under state law.260
254. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.004 (West 2015).
255. See supra note 28.
256. See supra Part III.A.
257. Id.
258. Alderman, supra note 10, at 1061.
259. Id. at 1054.
260. See id. at 1054, 1060–61.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\2-3\TWR303.txt unknown Seq: 35  4-DEC-15 10:43
2015] SURGICAL ARBITRATION 447
The commentator claims this approach will benefit both the na-
tional denominations and local churches by reducing litigation.261
While the reduction in litigation will certainly benefit the national de-
nominations, a local church will not likely see the benefit of being
deprived of both its property and access to a remedy in civil court.
Finally, the policy motivation underlying the commentator’s propo-
sal is not a sufficient reason to justify the judicial advantage the pro-
posal confers upon the national denominations.262 Church splits are
often due to political differences that are entangled with disagreement
over perceived changes in religious doctrine. The commentator la-
ments “[N]ational denominations . . . which already face problems due
to splintering factions . . . already weakened by modern social pres-
sures and issues will become even weaker when faced with divisive
state legal battles.”263 While the current plight of the national denomi-
nations is tragic, hierarchical church property disputes are just one
symptom of a more complicated situation in society at large. Unfortu-
nately, the church-constitution-centered approach to the neutral-prin-
ciples-of-law method is not the answer.
The advantage the church-constitution-centered approach vests in a
targeted class of religious groups likely violates the establishment
clause. While this solution does not overtly preempt state law, its ap-
plication as described would likely produce its functional equivalent.
Therefore, this proposal implicates many of the same concerns with
undermining federalism that attended the federal statute proposal.
The concern for the wellbeing of the faltering national denominations
is not unfounded, but without a more fully articulated public policy
concern, the proposed church-constitution-centered approach cannot
be justified due to its constitutional costs.
C. Strict neutral-principles-of-law method ignores the ecclesiastical
nature of the dispute.
The strict-neutral-principles-of-law method is a variation used by
some courts that first looks only at the language of the deed and then
either to trust law or corporate law as necessary to vest the title.264
Under this approach, the court ignores the national denomination’s
constitution altogether.265 One perceived benefit of this method is that
it does not require the court to use special rules for the resolution of
church property disputes, but instead treats such a dispute like any
261. Id. at 1062.
262. Id. at 1051 (“A national denomination already weakened by modern social
pressures and issues will become even weaker when faced with divisive state legal
battles.”).
263. Id.
264. Gerstenblith, supra note 13, at 544–45.
265. Id. at 545–46.
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other quiet title action.266 The commentator argues that courts look-
ing to national denominational constitutions often find the existence
of a trust where there is not a sufficient manifestation of intent to
form one.267 The commentator finds parallels between courts favoring
national labor unions in property disputes with breakaway local un-
ions.268 The commentator concludes that, while there are valid public
policy concerns for strengthening national labor unions, the First
Amendment forecloses that public policy from extension into the
church-property-dispute arena.269
While the commentator’s arguments are well-reasoned and compel-
ling, the functional justification for the special status of religion could
conceivably call for the indirect strengthening of national denomina-
tions, if these organizations were the only religious institutions willing
(or able) to fulfill the role. Further, strict neutral principles exacerbate
the mandated blindness of the courts to the true cause of the dispute,
therefore amplifying the core flaw in the neutral-principles-of-law
method.
D. Alternative dispute resolution addresses the flaw but ignores the
benefits of neutral-principles-of-law method.
After more jurisdictions began to adopt the neutral-principles-of-
law method, its implications for national denominations became more
apparent. National denominations began to look to alternative dispute
resolution for relief.270 One commentator proposes that alternative
dispute resolution may be the best method of adjudicating church
property disputes because it would allow experts to render more in-
formed settlements, it would relieve judges from having to deal with
thorny First Amendment issues, and it would promote judicial econ-
omy in general by relieving such troublesome claims.271
Alternative dispute resolution squarely addresses the neutral-prin-
ciples-of-law method’s core flaw of ignoring the true cause of the dis-
pute. However, it might trade-out experts in the application of
property law for experts in religious disputes, while at the same time
266. Id. at 543.
267. See id. at 571–72.
268. Id. at 570.
269. Id. at 571 (“Judicially-created legal rules that permit enforcement of otherwise
unenforceable restrictions on the local entity’s retention of its property would have
the effect of strengthening the religious hierarchy and discouraging the formation of
new schismatic religions. Although a comparable result is certainly permissible and
may be desirable to effectuate other policies, such as national labor policy, this result
among religious organizations clearly violates the religion clauses of the first
amendment.”).
270. Michael William Galligan, Note, Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 2007, 2036 (1983).
271. Id. at 2036–37.
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mostly forfeiting the parties’ right to an appeal in the event of error as
courts possess little power to review arbitration awards.
PC(USA) has resolved some of its recent property disputes with
negotiations, typically by extracting an exit fee from a disassociating
local church to compensate PC(USA) for its future loss of that local
church’s annual dues.272 The fee varies according to the particular
presbytery and local church involved, but the most common figure is
around 10% of the local church’s property value.273  Many congrega-
tions have simply relinquished their church property to their presby-
tery and walked away rather than pay the fee.
Without all the particular facts, it is difficult to tell if PC(USA) fi-
nancially assisted the founding or maintenance of any of these local
churches. If PC(USA) did not financially assist the local churches, the
situation could easily be construed that the presbyteries are simply
assessing an exit toll on real property they had no legitimate interest
in, and the local churches capitulate and pay the fee in order to avoid
a more costly and time consuming lawsuit. PC(USA)’s settlements do
not fully utilize the advantages of alternative dispute resolution
(“ADR”). The ADR process’s heightened access to religious experts
should result in more informed settlements between national denomi-
nations and local churches.  The hope is that the more information
available in the settlement process, the more just the outcome will be,
and the more amicable the disassociation will be. While PC(USA)’s
current settlement strategy is relieving the strain on judicial economy
to some extent by keeping many church property disputes off the
dockets, that strategy is failing to deliver the full benefits of ADR to
the community.
E. Surgical Arbitration
It seems that the true problem with the Watson hierarchical defer-
ence rule is not that a court must defer on issues of doctrine, but
rather to who it must defer. Under Watson, a court is required to ef-
fectively defer the adjudication of property ownership dispute to one
party of the lawsuit (or its functional equivalent), who is unlikely to
ever rule against itself because of its economic and religious self-inter-
ests. Most contentions with the neutral-principles-of-law method
share the common undercurrent that the method overcorrects for the
preference enjoyed by national denominations under the Watson hier-
272. Highland Park Presbyterian Church in Dallas had filed suit to test the Trust
Clause, but instead of following through agreed to pay Grace Presbytery $7.8 million
in return for the PC(USA) releasing it from the Trust Clause and the denomination.
Rob Allen, Grace Presbytery, Highland Park Presbyterian Church settle lawsuit, PRES-
BYTERIAN CHURCH (USA) (September 10, 2014), http://www.pcusa.org/news/2014/9/
10/grace-presbytery-highland-park-presbyterian-church/.
273. Presbyterian Lay Committee, supra note 204.
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archical deference rule by ignoring the ecclesiastical character and
value of the national denomination all together.
A compromise could be forged to alleviate these foundational is-
sues by adding a factor to be considered in addition to the neutral-
principles-of-law method. This Comment proposes to use the surgical
arbitration of two questions to create a hybrid of the departure-from-
doctrine rule and the neutral-principles-of-law method—as ox-
ymoronic as that appears.
This Section will demonstrate the following six considerations: (1)
that the surgical arbitration of a single factor can insulate a court from
the unconstitutionality of using a variation of the departure-from-doc-
trine rule, (2) the procedural organization to accomplish the surgical
arbitration, (3) how the result of the surgical arbitration would be
used by a court, (4) that the surgical arbitration method is not inher-
ently biased to either a local church or a national denomination, (5)
the benefits of arbitrating this single factor rather than the entire
property dispute, and (6) how to encourage local churches and na-
tional denominations to opt into the surgical arbitration method.
1. Arbitration in General
Arbitration uses principles of contract law to effectuate an alterna-
tive to resolving a dispute through litigation.274 Though arbitration is
an ancient system with a “rich historical tradition” of resolving dis-
putes between sovereigns, its use between private actors in the United
States is a relatively modern development.275 Congress passed the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925, allowing parties involved in
international or interstate commerce to enter into irrevocable and en-
forceable arbitration agreements, escapable only “on grounds for the
revocation of any contract.”276
The death of the “non-arbitrability” doctrine catalyzed arbitration’s
expansion into areas beyond those contemplated by the FAA, includ-
ing disputes between individuals and corporations.277 In the wake of
that expansion, questions lingered about the constitutionality of arbi-
tration in general.278 These questions revolved around the waivability
of Article III, potential interference with executive authority under
Article II,279 federalism implications,280 and the possible violations of
274. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 44 (4th Pocket ed. 2011) (“[a] dispute-resolution
process in which the disputing parties choose one or more neutral third parties to
make a final and binding decision resolving the dispute.”).
275. PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 3–4 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2013).
276. Id. at 3 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq); see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West).
277. RUTLEDGE, supra note 275, at 4.
278. See id.
279. “Did the [binational panel of arbiters]’s remand order–effectively requiring
the Commerce Department to make certain findings–violate Article II’s provision
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the civil rights of individuals.281  The Supreme Court held in Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor that Article III’s provision
for the adjudication of matters, such as diversity or federal question in
federal court, are personal rights that can be waived.282
Rutledge argues that Article III rights are not waivable considering
the Schor Court’s lack of analysis of this “bold assertion” against the
textual, structural, and historical context of Article III,283 its “con-
fla[tion] of arbitration with settlement,”284 and its failure to address
the mandated enforcement of arbitration awards consequential dimin-
ishment of judicial power.285 For these reasons, Rutledge states that
the waivability theory for the constitutional validity of arbitration is
too “facile.”286
The appellate review theory, first proposed by Fallon, advances the
proposition that non-Article III adjudicators (mostly referring to ad-
ministrative agencies) can satisfy Article III requirements by submit-
ting to Article III court review and following Article III court
precedent in making decisions.287 Though this theory aims primarily at
administrative agencies, it has implications for arbitration, as both are
non-Article III adjudicators.288 Fallon balances the values supporting
non-Article III adjudicators—expertise, governmental functions, flexi-
bility, fairness, and sovereign immunity—against the values necessitat-
vesting the U.S. president with the power to ‘take care’ that the laws of the United
States are ‘faithfully executed?’” Id. at 57.
280. RUTLEDGE, supra note 275, at 99–100, 101–24.
281. Id. at 168–69, 200–01.
282. “Moreover, as a personal right, Article III’s guarantee of an impartial and
independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other personal con-
stitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must
be tried.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1986).
283. RUTLEDGE, supra note 275, at 19–21 (“Nothing in the Constituion speaks in
terms of a ‘right’ to a decision in a federal forum . . . the use of terms such as ‘shall
extend’ and ‘all Cases’ . . . support a mandatory view . . . .”) (“The opening Articles of
the Constitution primarily address structur[e] . . . of government; most discussions of
rights appears in the Amendments.”) (“ . . . drafters’ failure to include a right to a civil
jury trial in Article III was among Anti-Federalists’ greatest complaints about the
Article during the ratification debate . . . .”).
284. Id. at 21–22 (stating in settlement parties know terms before agreeing to be
bound, while in arbitration parties agree to be bound before they know the terms,
settlements are subject to judicial review before enforcement, arbitration awards how-
ever are subject to limited review and are treated as if a judicial judgment).
285. Id. at 22 (“By mandating the enforcement of the award, and controlling scope
of Article III review, particularly the extent of review of federal questions, Congress
is effectively stripping federal courts of the power to interpret . . . federal law [and
giving it to] . . . arbitrators.”).
286. Id. at 23.
287. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Ar-
ticle III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 946 (1988).
288. RUTLEDGE, supra note 275, at 25 (citing Richard H. Fallon, JR., Of Legislative
Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 918–26
(1988)).
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ing Article III courts—separation of powers, fairness, and judicial
integrity.289
Fallon’s analysis of these values led him to conclude that the “neces-
sity and scope of [appellate review] turn on the type of determination”
being made by the non-Article III adjudicator.290 Pure questions of
constitutional law require de novo review by an Article III court in
order to ensure fairness to individual litigants when their constitu-
tional rights are at stake.291 Arbiters’ findings of constitutional fact are
not subject to review in Article III courts.292 Although Rutledge criti-
cizes Fallon’s acceptance of waiver theory, it is important to mention
that Fallon considers that voluntary waiver “substantially alleviates
any concern of unfairness.”293
2. Implications of Arbitration for Principles of Federalism
The primary drawbacks to the proposed solutions discussed earlier
in Subsections A and B, are those proposals’ detriments to federalist
principals. Arbitration’s implications for federalism are not nearly as
dire. There are numerous factors to consider when discussing arbitra-
tion’s impact on federalism, including agreement enforcement, proce-
dural law, and award enforcement.294 State contract laws promote
federalist principles by allowing each jurisdiction’s grounds for the
revocation of a contract to potentially nullify the arbitration agree-
ment.295 States enjoy a distinct role in the procedural aspects of arbi-
tration due to the unique options a state’s statutory or common law
might bring to the table.296 States are also not as bound by Section 10
of the FAA as a federal court would be in matters regarding award
enforcement.297 Choice of law clauses, choice of arbitral forum
clauses, and a party’s choice of forum when challenging or enforcing
an arbitration agreement—on balance promote federalism.298
3. The enforcement of an arbitration agreement
is not a state action.
A major issue regarding this Comment’s proposal is whether arbi-
tration is a state action. The action of an entity may be considered a
state action if it exercises a power traditionally used by the state, or if
289. Id. at 26.
290. Id. at 27.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 29–32 (citing Richard H. Fallon, JR., Of Legislative Courts, Administra-
tive Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 918–26 (1988)); Fallon, supra
note 287, at 991–92.




298. Id. at 101–04.
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the state takes significant steps to encourage certain conduct.299 One
argument that arbitration constitutes state action relies on the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Shelley v. Kraemer, where the Court held
that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants was a state action.300
Restrictive covenants and arbitration agreements are both private
agreements; therefore, if judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant
is a state action, then it would follow that the enforcement of an arbi-
tration agreement is also a state action.301 Rutledge counters that the
restrictive covenants at issue in Shelley differ from arbitration agree-
ments because the restrictive covenants affected third parties.302
Unfortunately, Rutledge’s rebuttal to the extension of the Shelley
argument—that judicial enforcement of arbitration is a state action—
does not insulate this Comment’s proposal. It is common for a church
to have long-term “visitors” who regularly attend but never formally
join a church’s membership. This class of people would technically be
a third party affected by an arbitration agreement. Additionally, this
situation is more akin to the facts in Shelley because the court found
that the state action ultimately violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which covers religious discrimination as well as racial discrimination.
Fortunately, a later Supreme Court decision reduced the reach of
Shelley by requiring that a state action involves more than just judicial
enforcement.303 Further, “[e]very federal court considering the ques-
tion has concluded that there is no state action present in contractual
arbitration.”304
Even though legal scholars continue to dispute the state action sta-
tus of arbitration, the courts have decided that arbitration is not a
state action. This has merely shifted the front of the battle over the
constitutionality of arbitration to the theater of due process.305 Al-
though procedural due process is not constitutionally required for ar-
bitration, due process protocols have proliferated throughout arbitral
bodies, likely because a “procedural irregularity” is “one ground upon
which parties can seek vacatur or resist enforcement of an arbitral
award.”306
299. Id. at 131.
300. Id. at 136; see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
301. RUTLEDGE, supra note 275, at 136–37.
302. See id. at 138–39.
303. “Without a limit such as this, private parties could face constitutional litigation
whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the
community surrounding them.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982).
304. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 4 &
n.11 (2005).
305. RUTLEDGE, supra note 275, at 169.
306. Rutledge posits four possible reasons including this one, but allowing Occam’s
razor to cut this line of inquiry short seems appropriate here. Id. at 148–49. For the
complete discussion see id. at 148–56.
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4. Arbitration agreements involving a religious question
have been enforced.
The final bridge to cross is to determine whether a court can en-
force an arbitration award that involves a religious question. The Su-
preme Court has not specifically ruled on this issue, but several courts
have had no problem enforcing agreements that involve a religious
question.307 A Texas court allowed the enforcement of an arbitration
agreement that stated:
[A]ny claim or dispute arising out of, or related to, this agreement
or to any aspect of the employment relationship, including statutory
claims, shall be settled by Biblically based mediation [,] and if that is
not successful, the matter “shall then be submitted to a panel of
three arbitrators for binding arbitration.308
For the time being, it appears that the judicial enforcement of an arbi-
tration agreement involving a religious question is acceptable.309
In summary, while arbitration continues to endure a multitude of
well-founded criticism from the academy, courts have found that Arti-
cle III rights are waivable, arbitration promotes federalism, judicial
enforcement of an arbitration agreement is not a state action, proce-
dural due process is not required, and arbitration can reach religious
questions.
5. The Single Factor to be Arbitrated: Unforeseeable-Substantial-
Deviation-from-Doctrine
This Comment proposes that, in addition to the neutral-principles-
of-law method, another factor be added to the analysis—the unfore-
seeable-substantial-deviation-from-doctrine factor. This factor must
be outsourced to arbitration in order to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition on the use of the departure-from-doctrine rule. In order
for the arbitrators’ conclusion to be binding, both the local church and
the national denomination would have to voluntarily opt-in to the
provision in writing. Ideally, the agreement should be executed in a
separate contract where both parties have equal bargaining power to
negotiate its terms. What must be in the agreement is the choice of the
particular arbitral body (proposed below), the establishment of a
307. See Encore Productions, Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D.
Colo. 1999); see also Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343 (D.C.
2005); see also Easterly v. Heritage Christian Sch., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-1714-WTL-TAB,
2009 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009).
308. Woodlands Christian Acad. v. Weibust, 09-10-00010-CV, 2010 WL 3910366, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 7, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
309. Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 501, 527 (2012) (“American courts, so far as possible, treat
challenges to religious arbitration exactly as they would challenges to secular arbitra-
tion—and exercise the same ‘presumption . . . in favor of arbitration,’ even in family
law disputes.”).
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charitable trust by the local church for the benefit of the local
church,310 and the specific agreement by both parties that they will
make certain stipulations in any church property dispute between the
parties.
a. Composition and procedure for the proposed arbitral body.
The proposed arbitral body will have to be created by the private
impetus of some concerned citizen or entity. The panel of arbitrators
will be composed of an odd number of neutral theological or philo-
sophical experts who have demonstrated their competence in the area
of dispute by their educational degrees, topic specialization, and abil-
ity to faithfully articulate the viewpoints of various competing posi-
tions on religious doctrines. Each party will be assigned an advocate
employed by the arbitral body to represent it in the proceedings. Each
party will have a comparable ability to select or protest panel mem-
bers in a manner somewhat analogous to voir dire in jury selection.
Once this panel has been selected, each arbiter on the panel will be
presented with the appropriate documentation representing the doc-
trinal views of the national denomination at the local church’s time of
affiliation and disaffiliation. After comparing these documents and
hearing the arguments of each side, which explain or refute the impact
of any alterations in doctrine, each arbiter will vote either yes or no in
response to two questions: (1) whether the doctrine of the national
denomination had substantially deviated from the time of the local
church’s affiliation, and (2) whether the perceived changes in doctrine
were foreseeable. If a majority of the arbiters vote “yes” to the first
and second questions, then both parties must stipulate to the court
that the intent and purposes of the national denomination have sub-
stantially and unforeseeably changed since the time of the local
church’s affiliation. If a majority of the arbiters vote “no” to either the
first or second question, the parties must both stipulate to the court
that the intent and purposes of the local church have substantially and
unforeseeably changed since the time of its affiliation with the na-
tional denomination.
b. How the outcome will be used by a court.
By importing the stipulation from the arbitral proceeding, a court
will no longer be prevented by the First Amendment from analyzing
the necessary elements of the equitable-deviation doctrine of trust
law. The equitable-deviation doctrine allows courts to modify a chari-
table trust themselves, or to allow a trustee to modify a charitable
trust when the occurrence of unforeseeable events require the terms
of a trust to be altered so that the purpose of the trust may be ful-
310. If one does not already exist.
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filled.311 Access to this remedy empowers the courts to alter charitable
trusts in response to instances where a local church unexpectedly finds
itself subjected to a national denomination espousing substantially dif-
ferent doctrine than when the local church affiliated with the national
denomination.
c. Surgical arbitration is not inherently biased.
Many of the previously discussed rules and proposals tend to be
inherently preferential to either the national denomination or local
church. The Watson hierarchical deference rule expressly gave na-
tional denominations a significant advantage.312 The application of the
neutral-principles-of-law method appears, so far, to give an advantage
to a local church—though not to the extent that Watson privileged a
national denomination. The federal statute decreeing the validity of
unilaterally executed trust provisions, like the Dennis Canon and the
Trust Clause, inherently favors the national denomination. The
church-constitution-centered approach would also validate such dubi-
ous trust provisions. In addition, that approach essentially hands over
all control of discovery to the national denomination, therefore inher-
ently favoring the national denomination. The strict-neutral-princi-
ples-of-law method is less prejudicial, but appears to aid the local
church somewhat more than the national denomination by ignoring
the denominational constitution altogether.
The substantial-unforeseen-deviation-from doctrine factor, decided
in arbitration, that allows the equitable-deviation doctrine to be in-
voked in a doctrinally motivated church property dispute is not inher-
ently prejudiced towards either the local church or the national
denomination. In the case of  PC(USA)’s recent exodus, the national
denomination could argue that its standard of scriptural interpretation
has not changed since the Plan of Reunion that established the current
incarnation of the PC(USA).313 It is that standard of interpretation
that allowed the PC(USA) to reach the biblically-based conclusion of
fully accepting LGBT persons into the fold by permitting them the
same opportunity to be ordained into the ministry that any heterosex-
ual person would have.
311. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (2003).
312. See generally supra Part.III.
313. The standard of interpretation was expressly stated in the UPCUSA’s Confes-
sion of 1967, preexisting the Plan of Reunion by more than a decade. BOOK OF CON-
FESSIONS, supra note 22, at 291 (“The Bible is to be interpreted in the light of its
witness to God’s work of reconciliation in Christ. The Scriptures, given under the
guidance of the Holy Spirit, are nevertheless the words of men, conditioned by the
language, thought forms, and literary fashions of the places and times at which they
were written. They reflect views of life, history, and the cosmos which were then cur-
rent. The church, therefore, has an obligation to approach the Scriptures with literary
and historical understanding. As God has spoken his word in diverse cultural situa-
tions, the church is confident that he will continue to speak through the Scriptures in a
changing world and in every form of human culture.”).
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Therefore, a reasonable arbiter could conclude that the doctrine of
PC(USA) has not substantially deviated since the affiliation of any of
its local churches, as 1983 is the earliest possible year of affiliation.
Even if an arbiter did find the implementation of that standard of
scriptural interpretation allowing the ordination of LGBT ministers to
substantially deviate from the doctrine of the national denomination
at the time of the local church’s affiliation, it is unlikely a reasonable
arbiter could find that such a development was unforeseeable given
the PC(USA)’s, and its previous incarnations’, long-standing and con-
sistent commitment to progressive civil rights positions. In fact, dis-
putes over Presbyterian ordination standards in America can be
traced all the way back to 1721.314 However, it still remains possible
that a reasonable arbiter could find that such a change was
unforeseeable.
Hypothetically, if the General Assembly of the PCA allowed for the
ordination of women tomorrow, this factor would aid local churches
seeking to disassociate from the PCA, as protest to the ordination of
women was one of the primary motivations to form the PCA. The
point is that whether this provision aids a local church or a national
denomination is not inherent in the rule itself, but is entirely depen-
dent on the facts as considered in a case-by-case basis.
d. Surgical arbitration in addition to the neutral-principles-of-law
analysis is a stronger solution than arbitration alone.
To hark back to Watson, one of the Court’s reasons for supporting
deference (though admittedly not its chief reason) is that civil courts
lack the theological expertise to handle issues of religious doctrine.315
One of the values of surgical arbitration is that it allows the true un-
derlying cause of the dispute to be addressed by experts in that field.
The logical inversion of the Watson Court’s statement is that theolo-
gians lack the expertise to quiet title to real property through the ex-
amination of deeds, the implementation of trust law, and the
application of corporation law. Civil courts are experts in these mat-
ters; therefore, the rest of a property dispute is best left to a court’s
implementation of the neutral-principles-of-law method.
To return briefly to Fallon’s points as applied to arbitration by Rut-
ledge, three values supporting arbitration are its flexibility, fairness,
and expertise.316 The proposed surgical arbitration utilizes the flexibil-
314. Michael Bauman, Jonathan Dickinson and the Subscription Controversy, 41 J.
EVANGELICAL THEOLOGICAL SOC’Y 3, 455, 457–60 (1998), http://www.etsjets.org/
files/JETS-PDFs/41/41-3/41-3-pp455-467-JETS.pdf.
315. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1872) (“It is not to be supposed that the
judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious
faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own. It
would therefore be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in the law which should
decide the case, to one which is less so.”).
316. RUTLEDGE, supra note 275, at 26.
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ity of arbitration to permissibly circumscribe First Amendment barri-
ers in a special situation where those rights obfuscate the true nature
of the dispute and serve as an impediment to the judicial mission to
promote a peace in society by justly resolving disputes. The surgical
arbitration approach is fair because it is voluntary, and the rule itself is
not inherently biased to one side of a dispute. Surgical arbitration
utilizes the expertise of theologians and philosophers without sacrific-
ing the expertise of the courts in the adjudication of property disputes.
According to Fallon’s theory, pure findings of fact by a non-Article
III adjudicator never require appellate review. Though findings of
constitutional fact should be available for appellate review for the
sake of fairness to individuals regarding their civil liberties, Fallon
states that voluntariness alleviates fairness concerns.317
e. Motivating volunteerism without coercion.
One could hope that both sides’ desire to be vindicated as correct
on the underlying doctrinal disagreement that caused the church prop-
erty dispute would be enough to motivate them into opting-in to the
surgical arbitration proceeding. This is unlikely though, as after the
dispute has arisen, whichever side that may be disfavored by the facts
could potentially refuse to participate. Ideally, the local church and
national denomination would enter into an agreement to use surgical
arbitration prior to a dispute arising. One way of motivating them to
do so would be to repeal the state’s current 100% property tax exemp-
tion for churches and replace it with a statute that grants between an
85% property tax exemption with the remaining 15% contingent on
the acceptance of the surgical arbitration agreement. The intended
purpose is to more effectively motivate local churches and national
denominations to seek to enter into the surgical arbitration agreement
because they are acting out of mutual financial interest, instead of
from an awkward initial contemplation of a future split. Hopefully the
financial interest involved would be sufficient to motivate the
churches without being so great as to be found coercive. The downside
to this approach is that any state encouragement raises anew the spec-
ter of the arbitration being considered a state action, which would de-
stroy the entire scheme.
The proposed surgical arbitration is constitutional because arbitra-
tion is not state action, courts can enforce arbitration agreements in-
volving religious questions, and the arbitral award specified by the
agreement of the parties requires them both to make resulting stipula-
tions through secular wording in a manner analogous to the secular
lens through which a court can examine church constitutions.
317. Id. at 27.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The special legal status of religious institutions in the United States
results in special problems for those institutions. If religion’s special
status is justified by its “function . . . helping to balance power, speak-
ing for the marginalized, articulating non-market values, and support-
ing personal spirituality and dignity,”318 then to the extent religion
operates adversely to those functions, it should forfeit its special sta-
tus. The majority of that discussion is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. The special problems hierarchical religious institutions face are
particularly evident when a split congregation is embroiled in a law-
suit to quiet title to church real property.
Though the neutral-principles-of-law method is a marked improve-
ment over the Watson hierarchical deference rule, it falls short of the
full implementation of justice. Just as the litigants in a church property
dispute are forced to argue around the dispute’s true cause, so too
have commentators critical of the neutral-principles-of-law method
latched onto the complaint of jurisdictional disparity of judicial en-
forcement. These commentators’ proposals veer back towards Watson
hierarchical deference because what they truly want to address is the
vindication of the national denominations’ doctrinal positions. The
most divisive doctrinal positions for national denominations in the
United States have historically been, and continue to be, centered on
the advancement of civil rights. Slavery, segregation, and the subordi-
nation of women to second class citizens, have all been defended by
some churches on doctrinal grounds.319 National denominations that
speak out on civil rights issues before certain segments of society are
ready to hear it pay the price in being lambasted as un-Biblical, and
rent asunder by the fractious division of their congregations.
The PCUSA is a prime example of this. As an early proponent of
abolition, desegregation, and women’s rights, the PCUSA saw its na-
tional denomination shatter four ways over its stance on abolition.
Those fractures never fully healed because of PCUSA’s latter stances
on desegregation and women’s rights. Today the PC(USA) is suffering
again for its stance that those in the LGBT community are not sec-
ond-class citizens. Dissenting congregations abandoning the PC(USA)
couch their opposition in religious doctrine and thereby prevent the
underlying cause of the dispute from being considered in court.
The neutral-principles-of-law method critics’ underlying perception
of insufficient justice in the rule is well-founded, but the solution is not
a veiled return to Watson hierarchical deference. The solution is in
addressing the true dispute squarely in the civil forum. Neutral-princi-
ples-of-law are not the enemy of national denominations. Ironically,
the shadows cast by the First Amendment are the true obstacle.
318. Rutherford, supra note 1, at 351.
319. See supra Part I.B.
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To circumvent this First Amendment obstacle to the just resolution
of hierarchical religious disputes, this Comment proposes the arbitra-
tion of a finding of facts. Whether a national denomination has un-
foreseeably and substantially deviated in doctrine from the time the
local church affiliated will be determined by arbitration. The arbitral
award of the proceeding will be a specifically enforceable agreement
for both parties to either stipulate that the national denomination’s or
the local church’s purpose and intent as an organization has substan-
tially and unforeseeably changed from the time of the local church’s
affiliation with the national denomination. The importation of these
stipulations from arbitration will allow the court to utilize equitable
deviation to modify an existing charitable trust on the arbitrated
grounds of unforeseeable and substantial deviation-from-doctrine.
The rest of the matter will be decided by the neutral-principles-of-law
method. By allowing the true nature of the dispute to affect the out-
come of the quiet title action in some way, justice is more fully served,
and the perceived deeper concerns of critics will be satisfied.320
320. Critics of the neutral-principles-of-law method’s application to hierarchical
church property disputes.
